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INTRODUCTION
In 1960, African-Americans in the South were substantially dis-
franchised by racially discriminatory registration procedures. Fewer
than one out of three blacks of voting age were registered, and whites
were registered at more than twice that rate. In Alabama, for exam-
ple, only 14 percent of African-American adults were registered, as
compared with 64 percent of white adults.' Not surprisingly, state
legislatures in the region were all white, although a few local govern-
ments had elected a black person to public office from time to time
in the years since World War 11.2 State legislatures, which in most
cases had not been redistricted in decades, were astonishingly malap-
portioned. Florida, where 12 percent of the population could elect a
majority of the state senate and 15 percent could elect a majority of
house members, was the most egregious example; the largest senate
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district had 98 times the population of the smallest, and the largest
house district was 109 times the smallest.3
By 1990 this portrait of inequality had been transformed beyond
recognition. Formal barriers to registration and voting no longer ex-
isted, and in some localities African-American registration and turn-
out approached parity with whites. Black office holding had become
routine and in some jurisdictions approached proportionality, as a
result of the elimination of racially discriminatory at-large election
procedures.4 State legislatures and local governing bodies routinely,
and uncomplainingly, apportioned themselves according to the one
person, one vote principle, with only modest deviation from absolute
equality. As political scientist Bernard Grofman puts it, the principle
of population equality had become the sine qua non of redistricting.
How can we account for this remarkable transformation in South-
ern electoral politics in a period of only 30 years? One aspect of this
change is well understood: the substantial elimination of racial barri-
ers to registration and voting was due primarily to the adoption and
implementation of the Voting Rights Act of 1965.6 The elimination
of malapportioned legislatures and of at-large election systems, on
the other hand, resulted from a more complex process in which liti-
3 See RICHARD C. CORTNER, THE APPORTIONMENT CASES 30, 162, 166, 182 (1970); ROBERT G.
DIXON, JR., DEMOCRATIC REPRESENTATION: REAPPORTIONMENT IN LAW AND POLITICS 8-9, 84,
174, 209 (1968); Richard L. Engstrom, Post-Census Representational Districting: The Supreme Court,
'One Person, One Vote,' and the Gerrymandering Issue, 7 S.U. L. REV. 173, 176-77 (1981). See also
Gordon E. Baker, Whatever Happened to the Reapportionment Revolution in the United States?, in
ELECTORAL LAWS AND THEIR POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES 257, 258 (Bernard Grofman & Arend
Lijphart eds., 1986); see also generally ROBERT B. MCKAY, REAPPORTIONMENT (1965);
REAPPORTIONMENT IN THE 1970S (Nelson W. Polsby ed., 1971).
See generally QUIET REVOLUTION IN THE SOUTH: THE IMPACT OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT,
1965-1990 (Chandler Davidson & Bernard Grofman eds., 1994). This is not to say, however,
that all jurisdictions had proportionality in representation or that all discriminatory electoral
rules had been eliminated.
5 Bernard Grofman, Criteria for Districting: A Social Science Perspective, 33 UCLA L. REV. 77, 80
(1985). SeeJ. Gerald Hebert, Redistricting in the Post-2000 Era, 8 CEO. MASON L. REV. 431, 471
(2000) (calling population equality "the most fundamental requirement the law imposes on
redistricters"). See also NCCSL REAPPORTIONMENT TASK FORCE, NAT'L CONFERENCE OF STATE
LEGISLATURES, REAPPORTIONMENT LAW: THE 1990S, at 17-40 (1989); Steve Bickerstaff, Reappor-
tionment by State Legislatures: A Guide for the 1980s, 34 Sw. L.J. 607, 635-43 (1980) (arguing that
state enacted reapportionment plans are constitutional unless invidiously discriminatory).
42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2000) (as amended). National policy is explained in STEVEN F. LAWSON,
BLACK BALLOTS: VOTING RIGHTS IN THE SOUTH, 1944-1969 (1976) [hereinafter LAWSON, BLACK
BALLOTS], and STEVEN F. LAWSON, IN PURSUIT OF POWER: SOUTHERN BLACKS AND ELECTORAL
POLITICS, 1965-1982 (1985) [hereinafter LAWSON, IN PURSUIT OF POWER]. For the quantitative
evidence, see James E. Alt, The Impact of the Voting Rights Act on Black and White Voter Registration
in the South, in QUIET REVOLUTION IN THE SOUTH, 351-77, 452-59 (Chandler Davidson & Ber-
nard Grofman eds., 1994).
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gation in the federal courts played the central role That process is
what this essay seeks to explain.
Beginning in 1962, the Supreme Court adopted the view that the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment required leg-
islative and congressional districts to be substantially equal in popula-
tion-the one person, one vote standard-to protect against what
came to be called quantitative vote dilution." The extraordinary po-
litical impact of these decisions was quickly dubbed the "reappor-
tionment revolution," perhaps the only revolution ignored altogether
by historians.9 The Court subsequently expanded the equal protec-
tion concept to include a prohibition on racial, that is qualitative, vote
dilution, particularly as manifested in the use of at-large elections or
its equivalent, multi-member legislative districts." The transforma-
tion of the electoral structure of Southern politics between 1960 and
1990 was due essentially to the implementation of these two concepts
of vote dilution through hundreds of federal court orders, assisted by
administrative actions of the Department of Justice, and reinforced
by Congressional decisions to expand and strengthen the Voting
7 This process was not always linear. At the outset, the implementation of court orders
striking down malapportioned legislative bodies sometimes conflicted with protection of minor-
ity voting strength. See, e.g., Peyton McCrary & Steven F. Lawson, Race and Reapportionment,
1962: The Case of Georgia Senate Redistricting, 12J. POL'Y HIST. 293 (2000). As legal scholar Robert
Dixon reminds us, "[f]requently in the course of constitutional development one problem is
solved or at least ameliorated only at the cost of creating or worsening another problem."
DIXON, supra note 3, at 456. Dixon argues that simple-minded focus on mathematical equality
by the Supreme Court can make matters worse to the degree that multi-member districts are
used to dilute minority voting strength, and he defines the term gerrymandering to include the
use of at-large elections. Id. at 460-64.
8 See especially Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962). My
understanding of the relationship between quantitative and qualitative (especially racial) vote
dilution stems from reading, and discussing with its authors, James U. Blacksher & Larry T. Me-
nefee, From Reynolds v. Sims to City of Mobile v. Bolden: Have the White Suburbs Commandeered the
Fifteenth Amendment?, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 1 (1982). See also Bickerstaff, supra note 5, at 646; James
F. Blumstein, Defining and Proving Race Discrimination: Perspectives on the Purpose vs. Results Ap-
proach from the Voting Rights Act, 69 VA. L. REV. 633, 661-63 (1983).
9 See the absence of references to studies of reapportionment in INTERPRETING SOUTHERN
HISTORY (John B. Boles & Evelyn Thomas Nolen eds., 1987); THE PAST BEFORE US:
CONTEMPORARY HISTORICAL WRITING IN THE UNITED STATES (Michael Kammen ed., 1980).
Studies by respected historians whose subject matter make a discussion of reapportionment
relevant (but which ignore the subject) include BARTLEY, supra note 2, and ALLENJ. MATUSOW,
THE UNRAVELING OFAMERICA: A HISTORY OF LIBERALISM IN THE 1960s (1984), and only perfunc-
tory references are to be found in DEWEY W. GRANTHAM, THE SOUTH IN MODERN AMERICA: A
REGION AT ODDS 308 (1994), and JAMES T. PATTERSON, GRAND EXPECTATIONS: THE UNITED
STATES, 1945-1974, 565 (1996).
10 See Burns v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73 (1966); Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433, 436-37
(1965). As one trial court put it some years later, "it is settled law that apportionment schemes
employing multi-member districts will constitute an invidious discrimination" where they
"minimize or cancel out the voting strength of racial or political elements of the voting popula-
tion." Graves v. Barnes, 343 F. Supp. 704, 724 (W.D. Tex. 1972) (quoting Fortson, 379 U.S. at
439 (1965)).
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Rights Act in 1970, 1975, and 1982." None of this, of course, could
have happened without the willingness of private citizens to assert
their rights in court and the ability of public interest lawyers to repre-
sent them effectively.
A number of related issues lie beyond the scope of this essay. De-
spite my focus on litigation in the federal courts, in the interest of
space, I largely ignore the internal deliberations of judges and jus-
tices and biographical influences on their legal thought. 2 Nor do I
explore the partisan consequences of either the one person, one vote
decisions or racial vote dilution cases, or join the debate over the
trade-offs between descriptive and substantive representation in redis-
tricting plans. 3 I also leave for another time the story of the confu-
sion in voting rights case law that developed in the 1990s, a develop-
ment that appeared to place the achievements of the preceding
quarter century in jeopardy. 4
I. RACE, POLITICS, AND THE LAW, 1960
The federal courts had not made much headway against the
Southern system of white supremacy by 1960, with the single excep-
tion of eliminating the all-white party primary at the end of World
1 The role of the federal courts in implementing protections against minority vote dilution
has not been investigated systematically. See HOWARD BALL ET AL., COMPROMISED COMPLIANCE:
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE 1965 VOTING RIGHTS ACT (1982) (focusing on the enforcement of the
pre-clearance requirements of Section 5 of the Act by the Department ofJustice). Ball's analysis
is quite different from the approach taken here and is discussed below; see also HUGH DAVIS
GRAHAM, THE CIVIL RIGHTS ERA: ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT OF NATIONAL POLICY, 1960-1972
(1990) (dealing with policies other than voting rights); ABIGAIL M. THERNSTROM, WHOSE VOTES
COUNT? AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND MINORITY VOTING RIGHTS (1987) (attacking many of the vot-
ing rights decisions of the federal courts and the enforcement of Section 5 by the Department
of Justice, but without focusing on the implementation process itself); Hugh Davis Graham,
Race, History, and Policy: Aftican Americans and Civil Rights Policy Since 1964, 6 J. POL'Y HIST. 12
(1994) (dealing with policies other than voting rights); Hugh Davis Graham, Voting Rights and
the American Regulatoiy State, in CONTROVERSIES IN MINORITYVOTING: TI-IE VOTING RIGHTS ACT IN
PERSPECGrVE 177-96 (Bernard Grofman & Chandler Davidson eds., 1992) (focusing on Justice
Department implementation).
12 The classic study of the civil rights decisions of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, JACK
BASS, UNLIKELY HEROES (1981), provides an example of this genre.
13 See, e.g., GARY W. COX & JONATHAN N. KATZ, ELBRIDGE GERRY'S SALAMANDER: THE
ELECTORAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE REAPPORTIONMENT REVOLUTION (2002); Kimball Brace et
al., Does Redistricting Aimed to Help Blacks Necessarily Help Republicans? 49J. POL. 169 (1987). See
also DAVID LUBLIN, THE PARADOX OF REPRESENTATION: RACIAL GERRYMANDERING AND MINORITY
INTERESTS IN CONGRESS (1997); Richard H. Pildes, The Politics of Race, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1359
(1995) (assessing the literature on descriptive vs. substantive representation).
14 See Pamela S. Karlan, Still Hazy After All These Years: Voting Rights in the Post.Shaw Era, 26
CUMB. L. REV. 287 (1996); Laughlin McDonald, The Counterrevolution in Minority Voting Rights, 65
MISS. L.J. 271 (1995).
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War II.15 African-American citizens in the South were subjected to
arbitrary and discriminatory restrictions on their right to register and
vote, including literacy tests; constitutional interpretation require-
ments, and poll taxes. Legal protection for minority voting rights in
the South was afforded only by lawsuits brought under the Recon-
struction Amendments. Prior to 1957, only private attorneys could
file such litigation, but in that year Congress adopted a Civil Rights
Act that created the Civil Rights Division in the Department ofJustice
and gave it authority to bring constitutional challenges to racially dis-
criminatory voting practices. Even so, the Department gained only
limited authority to challenge registration procedures jurisdiction by
jurisdiction, and, even in these purely local cases, not all federal
judges were willing to disturb the status quo. 7 Everywhere in the
South, African-American registered and turned out to vote at much
lower rates than whites, and in black-majority counties the poll books
often included only a handful of blacks.1
Where African-American did manage to register and vote in sig-
nificant numbers, Southern legislatures often adopted new electoral
procedures designed to dilute minority voting strength. Use of at-
large elections-requiring candidates to run city-wide or county-wide
rather than from smaller districts or wards-was the cornerstone of
the vote dilution structure. 19 Because racial minorities tend to be
residentially segregated, they often represent a majority of the pro-
spective voters in one or two election districts or wards and thus have
the potential for electing one or two candidates of their choice.
Where elections are conducted at large, however, where whites are a
1 See Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944). See also DARLENE CLARK HINE, BLACK VICTORY:
THE RISE AND FALL OF THE WHITE PRIMARY IN TEXAS (1979). Earlier decisions eliminating the
"grandfather clause," Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347 (1915), and Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S.
268 (1939), had little practical effect on the electoral rights of minority voters. Nor was there
much effect to later decisions, such as Davis v. Schnell, 81 F. Supp. 872 (S.D. Ala. 1949), affd,
336 U.S. 933 (1949), which struck down restrictive registration procedures in Alabama. See also
LAWSON, IN PURSUIT OF POWER, supra note 6, at 19, 44-54, 90-91, 96-97.
16 See LAWSON, IN PURSUIT OF POWER, supra note 6, at 86-89, 93, 109-10, 115, 134-39; Warren
M. Christopher, The Constitutionality of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 18 STAN. L. REV. 1, 3-4
(1965).
17 See generally CHARLES V. HAMILTON, THE BENCH AND THE BALLOT: SOUTHERN FEDERAL
JUDGES AND BLACK VOTERS (1973); DONALD S. STRONG, NEGROES, BALLOTS, AND JUDGES:
NATIONAL VOTING RIGHTS LEGISLATION IN THE FEDERAL COURTS (1968).
18 See U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 2, app. VII, at 222-56; GARROW, supra
note 1, at 6-11, 241-45.
19 See GARROW, supra note 1, at 179-236; J. MORGAN KOUSSER, COLORBLIND INJUSTICE:
MINORITY VOTING RIGHTS AND THE UNDOING OF THE SECOND RECONSTRUCTION 139, 163-80,
184-93, 224-26 (1999); LADD, supra note 2, at 29-30, 102-03, 307; MATTHEWS & PROTHRO, supra
note 2, at 4-5, 143-44, 208, 220-21; Armand Derfner, Racial Discrimination and the Right to Vote, 26
VAND. L. REV. 523, 553-55, 572-74; Peyton McCrary, The Dynamics of Minority Vote Dilution: The
Case of Augusta, Georgia, 1945-1986, 25J. URB. HIST. 199 (1999); McCrary & Lawson, supra note
7, at 302-04, 315-18.
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majority of the electorate, and where whites vote as a bloc against
candidates preferred by minority voters, the candidate preferences of
the minority community are submerged in the larger pool of white
voters. °
Even when voting patterns are racially polarized, in a simple at-
large system a cohesive minority group can use single-shot voting to
elect one representative if several offices are to be filled.2  By requir-
ing all voters to cast ballots for a full slate of offices to be filled, single-
shot voting becomes impossible. The same result occurs if each can-
didate is required to qualify for a separate place or post (i.e., Place No.
1, Place No. 2, etc.). Thus, both anti-single shot procedures and
numbered-place requirements enhance the discriminatory potential
of at-large elections.
The widespread use of laws requiring runoff elections where no
candidate receives a majority of the votes cast can also have a dis-
criminatory effect in an at-large system where voting is racially polar-
ized. If the candidate receiving a plurality of the votes wins, one mi-
nority candidate can defeat several white candidates wherever white
voters split their ballots sufficiently. Requiring a runoff in the event
that no candidate receives a majority of the votes cast, however,
eliminates that possibility by setting up a head-to-head contest be-
tween the top two choices, so that white voters can rally behind the
white candidate as a bloc. 3
Advocates of white supremacy were like the proverbial lawyer who
wears both suspenders and a belt: these dilutive devices served as lay-
ers of insurance for the status quo, to be called into play wherever
black political participation rose to a level that threatened white mo-
nopoly of electoral offices. Nothing better illustrates this principle
20 See EDWARD C. BANFIELD &JAMES Q. WILSON, CITY POLITICS 87-96 (1963); Chandler David-
son, Minority Vote Dilution: An Overview, in MINORITY VOTE DILUTION 4-5 (Chandler Davidson
ed., 1984); Peyton McCrary, Racially Polarized Voting in the South: Quantitative Evidence from the
Courtroom, 14 SOC. SCI. HIST. 507 (1990).
2 See U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT: TEN YEARS AFTER 206-07
(1975):
Consider again the town of 600 whites and 400 blacks with an at-large election to choose
four council members. Each voter is able to cast four votes. Suppose there are eight
white candidates, with the votes of the whites split among them approximately equally,
and one black candidate, with all the blacks voting for him and no one else. The result is
that each white candidate receives about 300 votes and the black candidate receives 400
votes.
22 See Katherine I. Butler, Constitutional and Statutoy Challenges to Election Structures: Dilution
and the Value of the Right to Vote, 42 LA. L. REV. 851, 863-67 (1982). See also ROy E. YOUNG, THE
PLACE SYSTEM IN TExAS ELECTIONS (Inst. of Pub. Aff. ed., 1965), for a pioneering study on the
use of the place system by municipal governments in Texas.
23 See CHANDLER DAVIDSON, BIRACIAL POLITICS: CONFLICT AND COALITION IN THE
METROPOLITAN SOUTH 63-67 (1972); Butler, supra note 22, at 866-67.
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than the adoption of a package of so-called "segregation bills" by the
Louisiana legislature 
in 1960. n
The day after a federal court in New Orleans had ordered the de-
segregration of the New Orleans public school system, newly elected
Governor Jimmie Davis announced to the state legislature that his
administration was sponsoring a series of bills "designed to preserve
segregation and at the same time maintain law and order in our
state." The architects of the administration package included two
leaders of the Citizens Council movement in the state, Willie Rain-
ach, a former legislator from northern Louisiana, and Leander Perez,
a planter-businessman who was a virtual dictator in Plaquemines Par-
ish, south of New Orleans. Rainach had chaired the Joint Committee
on Segregation from 1954 to 1959; under the influence of his com-
mittee, the legislature had enacted a host of racially motivated stat-
utes, and at Rainach's urging the citizens' councils carried out sys-
tematic purges of black voters from the state's registration 
rolls.26
Perez, long the district attorney of his parish but widely known as
"Judge" Perez, currently headed the state district attorneys' associa-
tion. An administration floor leader explained that the district attor-
neys' association had drafted the entire legislative package.27
These segregation measures included new restrictions on voting.
One bill required that the race of each candidate be designated on
the ballot, presumably to allow white voters to target any black candi-
dates. 2' Another sent to the voters a new constitutional amendment
designed to allow registrars greater latitude in keeping blacks off the
voter list. Its principal features were a more stringent literacy test, a
test of "good moral character," and a list of petty crimes-reportedly
the kind most often committed by blacks-that made citizens ineligi-
24 At the time the major disfranchising device was a requirement that prospective registrants
read and interpret to the satisfaction of local registrars any portion of the Louisiana or United
States Constitutions. This device was struck down in United States v. Louisiana, 225 F. Supp. 353
(E.D. La. 1963), affd sub nom. Louisiana v. United States, 380 U.S. 145 (1965).
25 James H. Giles, 'Hold Line' on Spending, Davis Urges Legislature: Asks for Enactment of Segrega-
tion Laws, NEW ORLEANS TIMES-PICAYUNE, May 17, 1960, § 1, at 1.
26 NUMAN V. BARTLEY, THE RISE OF MASSIVE RESISTANCE: RACE AND POLITICS IN THE SOUTH
DURING THE 1950s, at 74-75, 90-91, 135, 200-01,235-36 (1969); MICHAEL L. KURTz & MORGAN D.
PEOPLES, EARL K. LONG: THE SAGA OF UNCLE EARL AND LOUISIANA POLITICS 203 (1990).
27 See Anti-Mix Bill Ok 'd in House: Measure Designed to Alter Parish Set-Up, NEW ORLEANS TIMES-
PICAYUNE,JUNE 28, 1960, § 1, at 16 [hereinafter Anti-Mix Bill Ok 'd in House].
2s See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18:1174.1 (West 1960). The Supreme Court found this law un-
constitutional in Anderson v. Martin, 375 U.S. 399, 402 (1964), because "by placing a racial label
on a candidate at the most crucial stage of the electoral process-the instant before the vote is
cast-the State furnishes a vehicle by which racial prejudice may be so aroused," as Justice Tom
Clark stated for a unanimous Court, that it "may decisively influence the citizen to cast his ballot
along racial lines." Id.
May 20031
JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
ble to vote." According to a press account, proponents of these
measures believed that "morality qualification for voting will result in
the disfranchisement of a large number of Negroes."
30
Other provisions were designed to dilute minority voting strength.
Although no longer a member of the legislature, Rainach's influence
was so great that he was permitted to explain the administration's
segregation measures to the Senate Judiciary Committee. For exam-
ple, Rainach unabashedly described the racially discriminatory pur-
pose of requiring parish school board members to be elected by ma-
jority vote, or face a runoff: the bill "obviously was intended to block
any Negro candidates from becoming members of the school board
by getting a plurality vote, rather than a majority."
3 '
The bill also included an anti-single shot (or "full slate") require-
ment.32 In light of the fact that school boards were covered by the ex-
isting state-wide anti-single shot law,3 this provision was redundant,
except as an insurance policy.3 4 As it happens, the full slate require-
ment created numerous malfunctions in the electronic voting ma-
chines they state was using in increasing numbers. The state custo-
dian of voting machines, Douglas Fowler, tried for years to persuade
legislators to change the law, only to be told that "if you do this, then
a Negro will be elected."3
The state Constitution had for many years required parish govern-
ing bodies, called police juries, to be elected by districts rather than
at large. Recognizing the threat that African-American candidates
might succeed in winning office under a ward system, the Davis ad-
29 1960 La. Acts 1166 ch. 613 (amending LA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d)). These 1960 provi-
sions were not affected by the Supreme Court decision striking down the constitutional inter-
pretation test set forth in the 1921 state Constitution, which, the Court found, "as written and as
applied, was part of a successful plan to deprive Louisiana Negroes of their right to vote." Lou-
isiana v. United States, 380 U.S. 145, 151 (1965).
30 Vote Qualification Bill Passes House, PLAQUEMINES GAZETIE,June 24, 1960, at 6.
3 25 Segregation Moves Okayed: Rainach Talks; Senate Committee Acts, NEW ORLEANS TIMES-
PICAYUNE, June 28, 1960, at 5; 1960 La. Acts 999. The same day, July 9, 1960, the legislature also
adopted a runoff requirement for party committees. 1960 La. Acts 928 ch. 486 (revising
18:297).
.42 1960 La. Acts 999, ch. 539, 1001 (Sec. 1) ("Whenever there are two members of the
School Board to be elected, each elector shall vote for two candidates. Whenever an elector
shall vote for a lesser number of candidates than there are places to be filled, the ballot shall
not be counted for any of the plural candidates.").
33 1940 La. Acts 201, ch. 46 (Sec. 72) (codified as 18:351).
.34 Such full slate laws were in use in several Southern states, and, because racial or ethnic
minorities often used single shot voting as a means of electing candidates of their choice, were
widely understood as devices to dilute minority voting strength. See City of Rome v. United
States, 446 U.S. 156, 184 n.19 (1980); Dillard v. Crenshaw County, 640 F.Supp. 1347, 1361
(M.D. Ala. 1986).
35 Dep. of Douglas Fowler, Jan. 30, 1967, at 6-11, Amadee v. Fowler, 275 F. Supp. 659 (E.D.
La. 1967) (Civ. A. No. 3400), reprinted inJohn E. Rousseau, 'Single Shot' Vote Law Aim Was to Halt
Negro Election: Charge is Supported in Deposition, A. WEEKLY, Nov. 11, 1967, at 1.
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ministration included in its "segregation" package a new law authoriz-
ing the creation of charter commissions "to allow voters of any parish
to change their form of government to a commission form with
members elected parish-wide, if Negro voters became concentrated
enough in one or more wards to elect a member of their race to the
present police jury."3 6 An administration floor leader reassured legis-
lators who initially opposed the idea: "This is a segregation bill. I
hated to say it, but this was designed so that, if undesirables get on
parish police juries, the people could change their form of govern-
ment. A year later Plaquemines Parish put this plan into effect,
with Judge Perez serving as the leading member of the new Commis-
sion Council.38 The shift to at-large elections was to become the key
element in white efforts to minimize the effects of the growing black
vote in the South.
II. THE TUSKEGEE GERRYMANDER
A more complicated version of vote dilution is annexation-or, in
some cases, de-annexation-that is, altering the boundaries of a city
so that it significantly affects the percentage of minority voters in the
city's electorate. In 1957 the Alabama legislature redrew the
boundaries of the predominantly black city of Tuskegee in such a way
that virtually all its black inhabitants were beyond the municipal lim-
its, turning an 80 percent black city into a virtually all-white city and
thus eliminating the threat that African-American might elect a
member to the city council. The city was the home of the historic
Tuskegee Institute and a veterans' hospital; the black professional
staff of both institutions had been fighting mostly hostile registrars to
36 Anti-Mix Bill Ok'd in House, supra note 27, § 1, at 16 ("The Louisiana House Monday passed
76-15 its newest and hitherto undisclosed segregation bill to keep Negroes from getting on par-
ish governing bodies."). For the bill's text, see 1960 La. Acts 1202, ch. 631. See also Senate Passes
Group of Bills on Segregation, NEW ORLEANSTIMES-PICAYUNE,July 1, 1960, at 1, 3.
37 Anti-Mix Bill Ok'd in House, supra note 27, § 1, at 16 (comments to Rep. T.T. Fields). An-
other legislator complained that the proposal had been introduced precipitously without care-
ful study and discussion, but agreed to support the bill because of its racial purpose. Id. ("I will
vote with the administration, since it is a segregation bill, and the older members say it is all
right.") (comments of Rep. Lloyd Himel).
Commission Council Seated; Council Officers Elected, PLAQUEMINES GAZETTE, Sept. 8, 1961, at
1,4.
39 SeeJ. Morgan Kousser, The Undermining of the First Reconstruction: Lessons for the Second, in
MINORITYVOTE DILUTION 31-32 (Chandler Davidson ed., 1984); Derfner, supra note 19, at 553,
580; Davidson, supra note 20, at 8; LAWSON, IN PURSUIT OF POWER, supra note 6, at 212-15. Most
challenges to annexation or de-annexation have arisen in the context of enforcing Section 5 of
the Voting Rights Act. See, e.g., Perkins v. Matthews, 400 U.S. 379 (1971); Allen v. State Bd. of
Elections, 393 U.S. 544 (1969); City of Richmond v. United States, 376 F. Supp. 1344 (D.D.C.
1974), vacated by 422 U.S. 358 (1975); City of Petersburg v. United States, 354 F. Supp. 1021
(D.D.C. 1972), affd, 410 U.S. 962 (1973).
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secure the right to vote since the 1930s. At the time of the de-
annexation, black registration in Tuskegee had reached 40 percent of
the eligible voters in the city but was significantly lower in rural areas
of the county.
40
Sam Engelhardt, Jr., the legislative architect of what came to be
known as the "Tuskegee gerrymander," understood the process of
vote dilution. Several years earlier in 1951 he had persuaded the leg-
islature to pass a bill outlawing single-shot voting in Alabama munici-
palities because, as a fellow legislator Senator J. Miller Bonner ex-
plained, "there are some who fear that the colored voters might be
able to elect one of their own race to the [Tuskegee] city council by
'single-shot' voting.",4  Engelhardt was a leader in the state's White
Citizens' Council by 1957. The de-annexation plan for Tuskegee was
simply the latest in his efforts to maintain white control of the politi-
42cal process.
Civil rights lawyer Fred Gray promptly challenged Engelhardt's
43handiwork in federal court. The district and appellate courts, see-
ing the Tuskegee de-annexation as a type of legislative gerrymander,
declined to act, in deference to current Supreme Court precedents.
At that time the Supreme Court treated any challenge to apportion-
ment or redistricting plans as non-justiciable because it presented a
"political question." As Supreme Court Justice Felix Frankfurter put
it in the 1946 decision Colegrove v. Green, "[c]ourts ought not to enter
this political thicket. The remedy for unfairness in districting is to se-
cure State legislatures that will apportion properly.",44  In this in-
stance, of course, there was no chance the Alabama legislature would
remedy its racially discriminatory de-annexation of Tuskegee.
40 ROBERTJ. NORRELL, REAPING THE WHIRLWIND: THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT IN TUSKEGEE
89 (1985). See also id. at 60-78, 91-92, 95; KOUSSER, supra note 19, at 332.
41 Peyton McCrary & J. Gerald Hebert, Keeping the Courts Honest: The Role of Historians as Ex-
pert Witnesses in Southern Voting Rights Cases, 16 S.U. L. REV. 101, 120 (1989) (quoting State Sena-
torJ. Miller Bonner).
42 See NORRELL, supra note 40, at 91-92.
43 See Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 167 F. Supp. 405 (M.D. Ala. 1958), affd, 270 F.2d 594 (5th Cir.
1959), rev'd, 365 U.S. 339 (1960). Those precedents included disapproval of judicial inquiry
into legislative intent or motive. See also BASS, supra note 12, at 99-100, 106-109; TINSLEY E.
YARBROUGHJUDGE FRANKJOHNSON AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN ALABAMA 73-74 (1981). A memo by
Chief Justice Earl Warren's law clerk, initialed MHB, regarding Gomillion, mentioned that the
court below "held that the judiciary may not look behind the face of the statute to ascertain the
motivation of the legislature," and added "[i]f a statute, constitutional on its face, has the effect
of creating a discriminatory classification, then the statute is bad, even if it can be demonstrated
that the motives of the legislature were non-discriminatory." Memorandum from Law Clerk to
Justice Earl Warren, in EARL WARREN PAPERS 14-15 (Library of Congress 1985) [hereinafter
"MHB Memo"].
44 Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 556 (1946).
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The Supreme Court broke new ground, however, by invalidating
the de-annexation in the landmark decision Gomillion v. Lightfoot.
Justice Frankfurter, the architect of Colegrove, wrote the majority opin-
ion. Frankfurter persuaded his colleagues to strike down the Tuske-
gee de-annexation as a violation of the Fifteenth Amendment-on
the ground that it denied blacks the right to vote in municipal elec-
tions-rather than as a dilution of their voting strength in violation of
the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause.46 In this way
Frankfurter could take action against the infamous gerrymander
while still claiming that Colegrove was good law.47 Nevertheless, in sub-
48
sequent years Gomillion has routinely been seen as a districting case.
Lawyers interested in challenging malapportioned legislative plans,
moreover, saw the Tuskegee decision as a basis for persuading a fu-
49
ture Court to enter the redistricting arena.
III. THE COURTS INVADE THE POLITICAL THICKET
In the area of population inequality, the federal courts were part
of the problem before they created a solution. Before 1962 the fed-
eral courts refused to accept jurisdiction over challenges to malap-
portioned legislatures under the Colegrove doctrine. 50  Because most
45 Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960). See also CORTNER, supra note 3, at 71-72, 84-
88.
16 It may be that some felt that Gomillion was simply not the right case to address the "politi-
cal question" doctrine. See MHB Memo, supra note 43, at 6:
Of course, the Ct [sic] could write [a] very sweeping decision overruling cases such as
Colegrove v. Green and casting considerable doubt upon the continuing efficacy of the po-
litical question doctrine. However, I seriously doubt that a majority would consent to
such an opinion, and this is probably not the proper case for such a drastic depar-
ture ....
In a footnote, he observed that "a better vehicle for overruling Colegrove would be Baker v. Carr,
No. 103, 1960 Term, which involves a Tenn. Reapportionment statute and which is being held
for the instant case." Id.
47 Gomillion, 364 U.S. at 347 ("[T]he inescapable human effect of this essay in geometry and
geography is to despoil colored citizens, and only colored citizens, of their theretofore enjoyed
voting rights. That was not Colegrove v. Green."). Justice Frankfurter's opinion relied on evi-
dence of discriminatory effect to infer racial purpose, a departure from common practice. Id.
at 341. SeeYARBROUGH, supra note 43, at 74 (describing how the federal courts were reluctant
at that time to inquire into legislative motive). But see Gomillion, 364 U.S. at 349 (Whittaker, J.,
concurring) (concurring in the result, Justice Whitaker would have found the de-annexation a
violation of the Equal Protection Clause). See also Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 645 (1993)
(adopting Justice Whitaker's view by treating Gomillion as a redistricting case).
48 See, e.g., South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 311 (1966) (characterizing Gomillion
as forbidding racial gerrymandering); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555 (1964); Gray v. Sand-
ers, 372 U.S. 368, 376 (1963). See also Butler, supra note 22, at 877-78; Katherine I. Butler, Reap-
portionment, the Courts, and the Voting Rights Act: A Resegregation of the Political Process?, 56 U. COLO.
L. REV. 12 (1984).
49 See CORTNER, supra note 3, at 88.
50 The Court also refused at that time to hear numerous challenges to Georgia's county unit
system for electing candidates to public office. See, e.g., Cox v. Peters, 342 U.S. 936 (1952) (per
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state legislatures refused to reform themselves by equalizing the ap-
portionment of seats, that doctrine left malapportionment a wrong
without a remedy.
Lawyers representing established political leaders in Memphis,
Nashville, and Knoxville filed a lawsuit challenging the egregiously
malapportioned Tennessee legislative districts, which had not been
redrawn since 1901 despite a state constitutional requirement. Some
were Democrats, some Republicans; some were political conserva-
tives, some were liberals. What united them was the simple desire to
obtain a proportional number of seats in the legislature.5' The largest
district in Tennessee had more than 44 times the population of the
smallest district.52 The rural-urban disparities were not as great as in
some other states because the apportionment under-represented ru-
ral areas in the Republican stronghold of East Tennessee as well as all
metropolitan areas.53
This case presented the Supreme Court with an opportunity in
1962 to confront the Colegrove doctrine squarely. Over Justice Frank-
furter's adamant opposition, joined by that of Justice John Marshall
Harlan, on March 26, 1962, the Supreme Court decided in Baker v.
Carr that the plaintiffs had standing to challenge a legislative redis-
tricting plan, that the federal courts had jurisdiction to decide such
cases, and that the plaintiffs' claims were justiciable under the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 54  Challenges to
legislative apportionment do not, the Court found, present a "politi-
cal question" the federal courts need avoid.55 Although it remanded
the case to the lower courts for trial, the Court's decision that the is-
sue of population inequality was justiciable triggered massive litiga-
tion. During the spring and summer of 1962 redistricting lawsuits
were filed in 33 states. "The rush through the door unlocked by
Baker v. Carr," observed one legal scholar at the time, "has been stag-
gering."
5 6
On the same day in March, 1962, that the Supreme Court decided
Baker v. Carr, liberal Atlanta attorney Morris Abram filed suit chal-
lenging the county unit system by which primary elections for gover-
curiam); South v. Peters, 339 U.S. 276 (1950); Turman v. Duckworth, 329 U.S. 675 (1946);
Cook v. Fortson, 329 U.S. 675 (1946).
51 See generally CORTNER, supra note 3, at 35-44, 53-58, 89-91 (discussing common concerns
that motivate the push to reapportionment).
52 Grofman, supra note 5, at 80.
1 Engstrom, supra note 3, at 184.
54 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 197-98 (1962).
55 Id. at 209.
56 CORTNER, supra note 3, at 158-59 (quoting Arthur L. Goldberg) (internal citations omit-
ted).
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nor and other state officers were decided. 7 The only meaningful
election in Georgia in 1962, as had been true throughout the twenti-
eth century, was the primary election conducted by the Democratic
Party. County units were allocated on the basis of malapportioned
legislative districts; many of the state's malapportioned congressional
districts also used a county unit procedure to decide primary contests.
The system of weighting by unit votes meant that on occasion the
winner of state-wide contests was the loser in the popular vote. Other
plaintiffs filed challenges to the state's malapportioned legislative and
congressional districting plans .5
The dimensions of malapportionment infecting the election of
state officers, legislators, and congressmen were awesome. Many of
Georgia's 159 counties were extremely small. Echols County, the
smallest, had only 1,876 people in 1960, but it had one state repre-
sentative (and thus two unit votes). By contrast, Fulton County,
which contained the state capital Atlanta, had a population of
556,326, but only three representatives (and thus only six unit votes).
Assuming a rough correspondence between population size and the
number of voters, the mathematical weight of an individual vote in
Echols County was thus 98.9 times that in Fulton County.60
57 See Sanders v. Gray, 203 F. Supp. 158 (N.D. Ga. 1962), vacated sub nom. Gray v. Sanders,
372 U.S. 368 (1963).
58 Under rules established by state law in 1917, a gubernatorial candidate had to win a ma-
jority of "unit votes" to receive the Democratic nomination. Whoever won a plurality of the
votes cast in a particular county received all of its unit vote, defined as twice the number of seats
allotted the county in the state house of representatives. EmmetJ. Bondurant, A Stream Polluted
at Its Source: The Georgia County Unit System, 12J. PUB. L. 86, 86-89 (1963).
59 Toombs v. Fortson, 205 F. Supp. 248 (N.D. Ga. 1962) (challenging legislative malappor-
tionment). The House had not been reapportioned in decades despite the command of the
state constitution. The Senate was also malapportioned and in multi-county districts through-
out the state, counties rotated the right to elect the state senator for a single term. For this rea-
son counties that were already under-represented on a population basis found themselves un-
able to elect a resident senator for two terms out of three. See Wesberry v. Vandiver, 206 F.
Supp. 276 (N.D. Ga. 1962), rev'd sub noma. Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964) (striking down
a malapportioned districting scheme).
60 Joseph L. Bernd, Georgia: Static and Dynamic, in THE CHANGING POLITICS OF THE SOUTH
294, 297-99, 315-23 (William C. Havard ed., 1972) (demonstrating that there was also a racial
dimension to the county unit system); Bondurant, supra note 58, at 89-91. The dominant fac-
tion in Georgia politics, led by Eugene Talmadge and his son Herman, long depended upon
putting together the votes of enough "two-unit" counties in southern Georgia to overcome op-
position strength in metropolitan areas. In Atlanta and other cities, African-Americans had be-
gun to register and vote in larger numbers after the federal courts outlawed the white primary
in 1946. Because the allocation of county unit votes greatly underrepresented the urban coun-
ties where black voting strength was concentrated, the Talmadges saw the system as a barrier
against "the anti-segregation pro-civil rights crowd who seek to destroy the County Unit System
so they can control elections to state offices by manipulating the bloc vote centered in Atlanta."
McCrary & Lawson, supra note 7, at 296, 313. On the racial implications of the term "bloc vote,"
see V.0. KEY, JR., SOUTHERN POLITICS IN STATE AND NATION 636, 648 (1949); MATTHEWS &
PROTHRO, supra note 2, at 224-29. See also South v. Peters, 339 U.S. 276, 277-78 (1950) (Doug-
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Hoping to forestall a hostile court decision, the Georgia legisla-
ture enacted a plan that revised the county unit system by creating
more unit categories so as to give somewhat greater weight to more
populous counties.6' The day after the legislature adjourned, the
three-judge panel struck down the county unit system. Even as modi-
fied, the method of apportioning unit votes in primary elections for
statewide, congressional, and some judicial offices violated the equal
protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." A year later the
Supreme Court found that such a county unit system in any form was
unconstitutional, because the equal protection clause requires a
standard of "one person, one vote."63
The Court's next major apportionment decision, Wesbery v. Sand-
ers,64 also arose in Georgia, where a liberal state senator challenged
the malapportionment of congressional districts. The state's fifth dis-
trict in metropolitan Atlanta, the second most populous in the na-
tion, had 823,680 residents (109 percent over the ideal population),
as compared with only 272,154 residents (31 percent under the ideal)
in the smallest district.6' The Court, finding in Wesberry's favor, de-
cided that Article I, Section 2, of the Constitution requires that "one
man's vote in a congressional election is to be worth as much as an-
other's., 66 Writing for the majority, Justice Hugo Black went through
a lengthy historical account of the framing of Article I in 1787 to jus-
tify his view that the Constitution requires population equality in
67congressional districts. Justice John M. Harlan was harsh in dissent,
charging that "[t]he constitutional right which the Court creates is
manufactured out of whole cloth," but he was right that there is little
solid evidence to support the majority's interpretation.6
las, J., dissenting) (calling the County Unit System "the 'last loophole' around our decisions
holding that there must be no discrimination because of race in primary as well as general elec-
tions").
61 Fulton County would have 40 unit votes, for example, instead of six, meaning that the
mathematical weight of individual votes in Echols County would be only 14 times greater than
those in Fulton. See McCrary & Lawson, supra note 7, at 298.
62 Sanders, 203 F. Supp. 158.
63 Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 381 (1963).
CA 376 U.S. 1 (1964).
65 Engstrom, supra note 3, at 188.
Wesbeny, 376 U.S. at 8. The requirement of population was to be met "as nearly as practi-
cable," said the Court, but in time the standard in congressional redistricting cases came to be
virtually zero deviation. Id. at 7-8. See Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725 (1983); Kirkpatrick v.
Preisler, 394 U.S. 526 (1969). Deviations up to ten percent have routinely been permitted in
state legislative and local redistricting plans.
Wesberny, 376 U.S. at 7-18.
68 Id. at 42. See Alfred H. Kelly, Clio and the Court: An Illicit Love Affair, 1965 Sup. CT. REV. 119,
135 (Philip B. Kurland ed., 1965) ("Mr. Justice Harlan, in dissent, had all the better of the his-
torical argument.").
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In Alabama, where the legislature had not reapportioned itself
since 1901, young liberal lawyers from Birmingham and Mobile, rep-
resenting business and labor groups disgruntled with the rural stran-
glehold on state government, initiated lawsuits along the lines of
Baker v. Cart.6" A trial court found in their favor, ruling that the exist-
ing apportionment scheme constituted "'invidious discrimination' in
violation of the Equal Protection Clause."7 The modest remedy or-
dered by the court left most of the plaintiffs dissatisfied, but the in-
creasing cost of the litigation prevented them from appealing to the
Supreme Court. The state attorney general, moderate Richmond
Flowers, also decided not to appeal. As it happened, the major ex-
penses of appeal were borne by probate judges from two black belt
counties who, with the encouragement of Governor George Wallace,
decided to take the case up for the purpose of urging the justices to
reverse Baker.7
In June, 1964, the Supreme Court completed the second phase of
the reapportionment revolution by deciding in favor of plaintiffs in
state legislative apportionment cases affecting fifteen states in June,
1964, with the key decision coming in the Alabama case Reynolds v.
Sims.7 2 Writing for a majority of six justices, Chief Justice Earl Warren
reviewed the Court's earlier decisions protecting the right of black
citizens to register and vote, including the elimination of the white
primary, but observed that "the right of suffrage can be denied by a
debasement or dilution of the weight of a citizen's vote just as effec-
tively as by wholly prohibiting the free exercise of the franchise.
73
In striking down Alabama's malapportioned legislative scheme,
the Court found that the Equal Protection Clause requires a state to
make "an honest and good faith effort to construct districts, in both
houses of its legislature, as nearly of equal population as is practica-
ble. 74 Deviations from the ideal-sized district would have to be justi-
fied by a "rational state policy," said the Court, without making clear
what might satisfy this standard.
The Chief Justice did not bother with what would have been a
fruitless effort to demonstrate that the intent of the framers of the
69 369 U.S. 186 (1962). See CORTNER, supra note 3, at 160-91 (exploring differences between
the positions of Charles Morgan, David Vann, andJohn McConnell).
70 Sims v. Frink, 208 F. Supp. 431, 435 (M.D. Ala. 1962).
71 CORTNER, supra note 3, at 189-90, 2001.
72 377 U.S. 533 (1964). See Dixon, supra note 3, at 261-67, 288-89 (referring to Reynolds v.
Sims as the "vehicle for the principled opinion in the "Reapportionment Decision"). Id. at 263.
75 Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 555 (citing South v. Peters, 339 U.S. 276, 279 (1950) (Douglas, J., dis-
senting)).
74 Id. at 577.
75 Id. at 579. Factors mentioned as potentially valid reasons for departure from population
equality included respect for political subdivision boundaries and "natural or historical bound-
ary lines." Id. at 578-81.
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Fourteenth Amendment included the goal of guaranteeing popula-
tion equality among legislative districts. Justice Harlan, as usual in
dissent, demonstrated that such an effort would have been to no
avail.
76
Opposition to the one person, one vote standard was initially sub-
stantial. In the Senate, Everett Dirksen, a conservative Illinois Repub-
lican who served as Senate minority leader, liberal New York Republi-
can Jacob Javits, and moderate Democrat Frank Church of Idaho,
introduced constitutional amendments that, if adopted, would have
permitted a deviation from equipopulous districts in one house of a
state legislature, where supported by a majority of voters in a referen-
dum. The Dirksen amendment fell only seven votes short of the re-
quired two-thirds majority in a pivotal vote on August 4, 1965, the
same day the Senate approved the Voting Rights Act." A stronger
proposal by segregationist William M. Tuck of south-side Virginia that
would "strip the federal courts of all power over state legislative ap-
portionment" passed the House by a substantial margin but was de-
feated by liberal opponents in the Senate. After 1966 congressional
opposition inexplicably evaporated.78
The requirements for congressional districting plans came to be
rigorous indeed. For three decades any departure from mathemati-
cal equality has had to be justified by reference to alternative criteria
such as respect for political subdivision borders or natural bounda-
ries. Few districting requirements have, in fact, sufficed to win court
7lapproval even where plans have very small deviations. Plans for re
districting state legislatures or local governing bodies, however, are
76 See id. at 590-608 (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("I think it demonstrable that the Fourteenth
Amendment does not impose this political tenet on the States or require this Court to do so.").
ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO VOTE: THE CONTESTED HISTORY OF DEMOCRACY IN THE
UNITED STATES 286 (2000) (writing of the one person, one vote decisions that 'Justices Frank-
furter and Harlan were surely correct that neither the founding fathers nor the authors of the
Fourteenth Amendment believed that an arithmetic equality of votes had to underlie all
schemes of representation."). On the other hand, in practice most state legislatures at the time
roughly approximated the one man, one vote principle. See Micah Altman, Traditional District-
ing ]Prnciples:Judicial Myths vs. Reality, 22 SOC. SCI. HIST. 159 (1998).
77 See generally CORTNER, supra note 3, at 236-40, 243-45; DIXON, supra note 3, at 374-76, 404;
GARROW, supra note 1, at 132 (discussing the rise and fall of the Dirksen amendment and the
passage of the Voting Rights Act).
78 Also defeated by strong liberal opposition in the Senate was a proposed moratorium on
further apportionment litigation sponsored by Dirksen and majority leader Mike Mansfield of
Montana. The American Bar Association proposed similar amendments. See CORTNER supra
note 3, at 245-46; DIXON, supra note 3, at 385-86, 396-97.
79 See, e.g., Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526 (1969) (rejecting Missouri's argument that a
fixed numerical variance should be considered de minimis and satisfy the "as nearly as practica-
ble standard"). In Karcher v. Daggett, the Court struck down New Jersey's congressional redis-
tricting plan even though it had less than one percent deviation. 462 U.S. 725 (1983).
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pennitted greater flexibility: total district deviations of 10 percent are
of "prima facie constitutional validity." °
In short, the Supreme Court created a new constitutional right
that had not existed previously. It was not justified by the legislative
history of the Fourteenth Amendment in the Reconstruction Con-
gress nor by court decisions prior to the Baker decision in 1962. In
light of subsequent development of the equal protection standard in
regard to racial vote dilution, it is worth emphasizing that in the one
person, one vote cases the Court did not (and does not) require
plaintiffs to prove that there was discriminatory intent directed at
residents of metropolitan areas, but merely that the unequal appor-
tionment had a harmful effect on their voting strength."'
IV. THEJUSTICIABILITY OF RACIAL VOTE DILUTION
The case that first established an analytical link between quantita-
tive and racial vote dilution was Fortson v. Dorsey." The case arose as a
challenge to the constitutionality of multi-member districts for the
Georgia state senate following court-ordered redistricting in the fall
of 1962. In Toombs v. Fortson, the trial court ruled, not long after
Baker was decided, that the Fourteenth Amendment required at least
one house of the Georgia legislature to be apportioned equally by
population.8 3 The court agreed to permit the legislature to postpone
a remedy until after the September Democratic primary.
4
The architect of senate redistricting in 1962 was the newly elected
governor and current president pro tern of the senate, Carl Sanders.
Although he cast himself as a racial moderate, like virtually everyone
in Georgia politics in those years Sanders actively supported segrega-
815tion of the races. Sanders pushed successfully for a plan that pro-vided a reasonable degree of population equality, winning over the
80 Connor v. Finch, 431 U.S. 407, 418 (1977). See also Grofman, supra note 5, at 82 n.19 (in-
ternal citations omitted) ("Total deviation is the sum in absolute value of the deviations from
ideal (average) district size of the largest district and of the smallest district.").
81 But see Blacksher & Menefee, supra note 8, at 4, 34-37 (noting that in more recent cases,
the court has required plaintiffs to prove a racially invidious purpose in order to prevail);
KOUSSER, supra note 19, at 332-33 (noting that following Gomillion, the court took two paths,
one that did not require discriminatory intent and one that did).
82 379 U.S. 433 (1965).
83 205 F. Supp. 248, 256-57 (N.D. Ga. 1962). The court also struck down the existing policy
of rotating senators in multi-county districts after each two-year term, so that voters in only one
of the counties were permitted to vote in each election. Id. at 257.
84 Id. at 258-59. See also McCrary & Lawson, supra note 7, at 298, 314 n.36 (providing a chro-
nology of the events surrounding the decision).
85 JAMES F. COOK, CARL SANDERS: SPOKESMAN OF THE NEW SOUTH 92-93 (1993) (describing
that although Sanders professed a belief in segregation, "he seemed to understand that the sys-
tem was eroding and someday would collapse"); McCrary & Lawson, supra note 7, at 299-301,
315 nn.43-54 (comparing Sanders' views to those of his contemporaries).
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rural majority by virtue of the fact that the legislature had little
choice. A consequence of this change was that metropolitan counties
stood to gain new senate seats. Sanders proposed that counties enti-
tled to more than one senator be required to use at-large elections
(also known as multi-member districts) rather than the single-
member districts used in rural areas.86
Despite the fact that the state constitution required single-
member senate districts, the Sanders team succeeded in persuading
both senate and house to approve the use of at-large elections. Most
legislators explained their willingness to overlook the constitutional
prohibition by pointing out that at-large elections serve as a way of di-
luting black voting strength. At least one supporter attributed this
motive to the governor-elect: "Sanders wanted the [at-large] provision
to avoid the possible election of a Negro senator from Fulton.,,8' The
most frequently quoted legislator was Frank Twitty, a veteran of al-
most two decades in the House who was, according to one press ac-
count, "generally acknowledged to be the most forceful speaker
there.88 Twitty "stepped in to lead the floor fight for Sanders' reap-
portionment bill, and spoke for attribution. 'As far as I am con-
cerned, I am not going to vote for anything that would automatically
put a member of a minority race in the Senate. '"'8 ' As Twitty saw it,
"without countywide races a Negro would almost certainly be elected
to the Senate from Fulton County."90
White plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of at-large elec-
tions in party primary elections as well as the general election. 91 Ful-
ton County Superior Court Judge Durwood Pye ruled that the state
86 In order to comply with court-ordered redistricting, the legislature had to reapportion at
least one of its two houses. McCrary & Lawson, supra note 7, at 302-03, 315-16 nn.58-73.
87 Ed Rogers, Showdown Nears on Revised Bill, CORDELE DISPATCH, Oct. 4, 1962, at 1; McCrary
& Lawson, supra note 7, at 302-03, 316. Sanders was aware of the discriminatory potential of at-
large elections because in his home town, Augusta, had adopted at-large elections in 1953 for
the specific purpose of keeping the city council all white. McCrary, supra note 19, at 208-11,
222-23 nn.55-69.
88 Rep. Twitty Ending 20 Years in House, ATLANTA CONSTITUTION, Apr. 1, 1964, at 1.
89 McCrary & Lawson, supra note 7, at 304, 317 n.80; Reg Murphy, House Votes, 177-15, to Give
Cities the Big Voice in New Senate, ATLANTA CONSTITUTION, Oct. 3, 1962, at 1, 12. Although the
principal focus was on events in Atlanta, some rural legislators expressed concern about the
threat of black office-holding closer to home. According to one press account, "the prospect of
being in a district with counties having a heavy Negro population is causing some uneasiness
among the legislators who foresee a time when a Negro senator may represent their district."
Celestine Sibley, House Gets Going on Districting, ATLANTA CONSTITUTION, Oct. 2, 1962, at 1, 10.
90 McCrary & Lawson, supra note 7, at 304, 316 nn.79-80; House Passes Senate Amendment, 178-
6, ROME NEWS-TRIBUNE, Oct. 8, 1962, at 1.
91 In state court the plaintiffs argued that the Georgia Constitution required single-member
districts. In federal court they argued that conducting some senate contests at-large and some
by districts was a per se violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. The federal court declined to
enjoin the use of at-large elections because it did not have sufficient time to consider the merits
of the plaintiffs' novel federal claim. McCrary & Lawson, supra note 7, at 305, 318 nn.86-87.
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constitution required senators to be elected by single-member dis-
trict, and he enjoined party officials from conducting the primary on• • 92
a countywide basis. As a result ofJudge Pye's ruling, LeroyJohnson,
a black attorney in Atlanta, won the Democratic nomination and an
African-American was the Republican nominee in the 38th senatorial
district in Fulton County.9" Under the single-member district plan,
the Democrat Johnson without difficulty won the general election to
become the first black elected to the state legislature since Recon-
struction .9
Judge Pye's order was superseded by the ratification on November
6, 1962, of a constitutional amendment authorizing at-large senate
elections beginning in 1964. To prevent this outcome, white Repub-
lican plaintiffs filed a constitutional challenge in federal court. They
contended that voters in Fulton and DeKalb counties, who had to cast
their ballots in multi-member districts, were as a result treated differ-
ently from voters in other parts of the state who were able to elect
their senators from single-member districts.9'
A three-judge federal court agreed: voters in Fulton county as a
whole could overcome even the unanimous preference of voters
within a single district, which treated voters in that district differently
than voters in true single-member districts elsewhere in the state.
"This difference is a discrimination as between voters in the two
classes," creating what the court called "a dilution of votes on the ba-
sis of homesite.9 6 This rather abstract-and non-racial-disparity in
92 Pye, an ardent segregationist, undoubtedly understood the racial implications of single-
member districts but he also believed in upholding the state constitutional requirements. The
defendants appealed Pye's ruling to the Georgia Supreme Court but also sought and won a
temporary stay of Pye's injunction from the three-judge federal court, which sought to preserve
the electoral opportunity for both sides in the controversy pending a final resolution of the is-
sue in the courts. The federal stay permitted Fulton County party officials to conduct the pri-
mary on a countywide basis, and also to tabulate them on a district basis. Pye subsequently ex-
tended his prohibition on at-large voting to cover the general election. McCrary & Lawson,
supra note 7, at 305-06, 318-19 nn.88-95.
93 In an at-large system, Johnson would have been forced into a runoff against white candi-
date Ed Barfield, who came in second in the countywide tabulation and last in a field of four in
the district tabulation. The Constitution editorial speculated that due to racial bloc voting, John-
son "will be hard pressed to defeat No. 2 man Ed Barfield in the runoff, according to the fat
overall vote cast for Barfield and for the other candidates now eliminated." Editorial, It Was a
Confusing Primary .... ATLANTA CONSTITUTION, Oct. 17, 1962, at 4.
94 McCrary & Lawson, supra note 7, at 306, 319 n.96.
95 See Complaint, Jan. 24, 1964, and Def's Mot. for Summ.J. with Attachments, Dorsey v. Fort-
son (N.D. Ga. 1964) (C.A. No. 8756), in the Record of Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433 (1965)
[hereinafter Record, Fortson v. Dorsey].
96 Dorsey v. Fortson, 228 F. Supp. 259, 263 (N.D. Ga. 1964), reu'd sub nom. Fortson v. Dorsey,
379 U.S. 433 (1965).
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treatment, the court ruled, violated the equal protection clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.'
7
The state appealed the decision to the U.S. Supreme Court. The
original white plaintiffs, now the appellees, argued in their brief that
the 1962 legislature adopted at-large elections in metropolitan coun-
ties "to minimize the strength of certain urban groups ... predomi-
nantly composed of racial and political minorities." 8  At oral argu-
ment, Justice Arthur M. Goldberg asked plaintiff's attorney, Edwin F.
Hunt, whether the case involved a claim of invidious discrimination
on the basis of race or party. According to the account of one ob-
server, "the Bench leaned forward and awaited eagerly the response,
as did the courtroom spectators." Hunt replied lamely that the plain-
tiffs did "not want the Court yet to say" that the right of minority vot-
ers to be protected from vote-dilution was "a constitutionally pro-
tected right."99
The Supreme Court reversed the lower court, on the grounds that
the harm claimed by the plaintiffs was "only a highly hypothetical as-
sertion."' ' Writing for the majority, Justice William J. Brennan ob-
served that in the last term, when deciding the landmark one-person,
one-vote case Reynolds v. Sims,' °' "we rejected the notion that equal
protection necessarily requires the formation of single-member dis-
tricts. ,,0 Reading between the lines, Justice Brennan addressed the
racial issue the white Republicans had ducked, borrowing the con-
cept of vote dilution from the population context in Reynolds. The
Court might have reached a different decision, he wrote, had the re-
cord demonstrated that the use of at-large elections, either "design-
edly or otherwise," would "operate to minimize or cancel out the vot-
ing strength of racial or political elements of the voting
population. "'0 Voting rights lawyers subsequently cited this as the
97 Id. at 264. The parties agreed as to the facts of the case, which the court decided on mo-
tions for summary judgment. The racial dimension of the controversy over at-large elections
was not raised at this stage of the proceedings.
98 Br. for Appellees at 7-9, in Record, Fortson v. Dorsey (citing a Pennsylvania reapportion-
ment decision, Drew v. Scranton, 229 F. Supp. 310, 327 (M.D. Pa. 1964)). Although this was a
plausible argument, noted the law clerk assigned to the case by Chief Justice Earl Warren,
"some evidence of the alleged discrimination would, I think, be necessary." JCG, Bench Mem.
at 9-10, Fortson v. Dorsey, No. 178 (Oct. Term 1964), Dec. 1, 1964, in EARL WARREN PAPERS
(Library of Congress 1985).
99 DIXON, supra note 3, at 477.
00 Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433, 436-38 (1965). The city's leading paper expressed stir-
prise at the reversal. See Editorial, More Confusion, But More Flexibility, ATLANTA CONSTITUTION,
Jan. 19, 1965, at 4.
101 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
102 Fortson, 379 U.S. at 436.
103 Id. at 439. Justice Brennan continued, "[w]hen this is demonstrated it will be time
enough to consider whether the system still passes constitutional muster." Id.; see also DIXON,
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earliest recognition by the Supreme Court that the Equal Protection
Clause might extend to the problem of racial vote dilution.10 4 Not un-
til 1973, however, did the Court actually strike down the use of at-
large elections on equal protection grounds in a Texas redistricting
case, White v. Regester.
V. THE ADOPTION OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT
By the time the Supreme Court decided Fortson v. Dorsey, both
President Lyndon Johnson and supporters of minority voting rights
in Congress had decided that litigation by itself would never provide
an effective franchise in the South. Even those judges who sought to
eliminate discriminatory barriers found that every time the courts
struck down one procedure, Southern local officials or state legisla-
tors devised newer, more subtle ways of minimizing black voter regis-
tration. Frustrated with the slow progress of the jurisdiction-by-
jurisdiction campaign before often hostile Southern courts, the
President asked the Civil Rights Division to draft a strong voting
rights law substantially increasing the Department's enforcement
106
powers.
The Voting Rights Act of 1965 departed from precedent by pro-
viding for direct federal action to enable African-Americans in the
South to register and vote. Section 4 of the Act suspended, initially
for only five years, the use of literacy tests in six states and 40 counties
in a seventh, North Carolina. To counter the broad discretion previ-
ously exercised by local registrars and poll officials, other provisions
of the Act authorized the use of federal examiners to register persons
in designated counties and federal observers to monitor the conduct
of elections. On the other hand, the Act also contemplated contin-
ued resort to the federal courts, instructing the Department of Justice
to file lawsuits challenging poll tax requirements in states where they
appeared to be used as a deterrent to minority voting.
07
supra note 3, at 477 (characterizing this statement as a "tantalizing invitation for further litiga-
tion").
104 See Laughlin McDonald, The Quiet Revolution in Minority Voting Rights, 42 VAND. L. REV.
1249, 1259 (1989) (detailing the relationship of Fortson to other civil rights cases).
105 412 U.S. 755 (1973).
106 See, e.g., GARROW, supra note 1, at 36-39, 4142 (describing the political climate and the
President's reaction to Southern states' obstructionist ways); Christopher, supra note 16, at 5-9
(providing summaries and examples of the battle between of the Department of Justice and the
states over the voting rights enforcement); Derfner, supra note 19, at 546-50 (describing the
federal government's increasing frustration with the states leading up to the Voting Rights Act
of 1965).
107 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973 (2003). See also Chandler Davidson, The Voting Rights Act: A Brief
History, in CONTROVERSIES IN MINORITYVOTING, supra note 11, at 7, 17-21 (describing the critical
provisions of the Act).
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The most novel feature of the Act-and, to those concerned with
the operation of our federal system, the most intrusive-was the "pre-
clearance" requirement set forth in Section 5.1°" Here, too, the stat-
ute blended judicial enforcement with administrative implementa-
tion. Under its terms all changes in voting practices in states covered
by the Act's special provisions must be approved by one of two fact-
finders before they can be legally enforced; either a three-judge
panel in the federal courts of the District of Columbia or the Attor-
ney General of the United States must "preclear" voting changes be-
fore they can be legally enforced.'" Administrative preclearance by
the Department of Justice has proved to be far speedier and less
costly than judicial preclearance, and has almost always been pre-
ferred by covered jurisdictions."0
In 1966 the Supreme Court ruled that the preclearance require-
ment, like other challenged provisions of the Act, was constitu-
tional."' In the past, whenever the Justice Department had obtained
favorable decisions striking down particular tests, Southern states
simply enacted new discriminatory devices, said the Court, and "Con-
gress had reason to suppose that these States might try similar ma-
neuvers in the future in order to evade the remedies for voting dis-
crimination contained in the Act itself."'"
In the first three years, implementation of the Act by the Depart-
ment of Justice and by the federal courts, focused on removal of bar-
riers to registration and voting. The Attorney General dispatched
federal examiners to register blacks and federal observers to monitor
elections in counties designated because of their record of obstruc-
108 The work most critical of the intrusive nature of the preclearance provisions of the Act is
THERNSTROM, supra note 11, at 26, 38, 157-58, 162, 170, 178.
109 See id. at 15-17 (observing correctly that Justice Department attorneys drafted the pre-
clearance provisions as a way of institutionalizing the "freezing principle" recently adopted by
the federal courts as a way of coping with the constantly changing discriminatory devices used
by Southern registrars and election officials). See also STRONG, supra note 17, at 44, 48-52, 93
(explicating the use of the "freezing theory" by the courts); L. Thorne McCarty & Russell B. Ste-
venson, The Voting Rights Act of 1965: An Evaluation, 3 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 357, 361 n.18
(1968) (providing the history of the "freezing" doctrine). Applications of the freezing principle
began with United States v. Alabama, 192 F. Supp. 677 (M.D. Ala. 1961), aff'd, 304 F.2d 583 (5th
Cir. 1961), affd, 371 U.S. 37 (1962); United States v. Penton, 212 F. Supp. 193 (M.D. Ala. 1962);
and United States v. Duke, 332 F.2d 759 (5th Cir. 1964), and was adopted by the Supreme Court
in Louisiana v. United States, 380 U.S. 145 (1965).
110 Morris v. Gressette, 432 U.S. 491, 503 (1977); Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544,
549 (1969); South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301,315-18, 334-35 (1966). See also generally
Drew S. Days, III & Lani Guinier, Enforcement of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, in MINORITY
VOTE DILUTION 167-80 (Chandler Davidson ed., 1984) (discussing the role of preclearance in
voting rights enforcement).
III See Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 309 ("Congress concluded that the unsuccessful remedies
which it had prescribed in the past would have to be replaced by sterner and more elaborate
measures .... ").
112 Id. at 335.
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tion and discrimination. As a result, most blacks were able to register
and vote.1 3 Initially, however, the Department ofJustice had to go to
court to prevent state court judges from blocking the work of federal
examiners and private voter registration activists.'1 4  The federal
courts also struck down the poll tax in four states that still used it as a
prerequisite to voting in state elections.1 1 5 The Justice Department
also objected to various changes in state law or local practices that
had the potential for restricting access to the ballot. The combina-
tion of administrative and judicial implementation brought a dra-
matic increase in voter registration among both black and white
Southerners. 6
VI. THE COURT CONFRONTS MINORITY VOTE DILUTION
Shortly after passage of the Act, the lower courts began to deal
with the problem of minority vote dilution at the same time as they
struggled to remedy violations of the one person, one vote standard.
The first instance in which the use of multi-member districts was
found to be unconstitutional, as it happens, was in Reynolds v. Sims, 17
subsequently on remand as Sims v. Baggett."' The court found the
113 Although examiners were used in only sixty counties, the threat that they might be dis-
patched, coupled with the fact that other provisions of the Act provided criminal penalties for
officials who interfered with voters' efforts to cast their ballots, brought substantial compliance
throughout the region. See U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 2, at 153-62 (provid-
ing a relatively contemporaneous description of the policy of enforcement and its results);
GARROW, supra note 1, at 179-86, 190 (detailing the history of the use of examiners and the re-
sulting effects); LAWSON, BLACK BALLOTS, supra note 6, at 329-35 (analyzing the policy rationale
for using examiners as a means of enforcement); Richard Scher & James Button, Voting Rights
Act: Implementation and Impact, in IMPLEMENTATION OF CIVIL RIGHTS POLICY 30-33 (Charles S.
Bullock III & Charles M. Lamb eds., 1984) (describing the role of federal examiners in en-
forcement).
11 Peyton McCrary et al., Alabama, in QUIET REVOLUTION IN THE SOUTH: THE IMPACT OF THE
VOTING RIGHTS ACT, 1965-1990 38-39, 398 n.8 (Chandler Davidson & Bernard Grofman eds.,
1994) (citing United States v. Bruce, 353 F.2d 474 (5th Cir. 1965); Reynolds v. Katzenbach, 248
F. Supp. 593 (S.D. Ala. 1965)); see also U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, THE VOTING RIGHTS
ACT... THE FIRST MONTHS app. E (1965) (listing the litigation brought under the Voting
Rights Act); U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 2, at 162-65 (describing litigation to
secure voting rights, implementing the Act, and removing burdens from franchise).
15 Harper v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (holding use of a poll tax uncon-
stitutional because it was not rationally related to voting); U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS,
supra note 2, at 166-67 (describing lawsuits invalidating poll taxes in Alabama, Mississippi,
Texas, and Virginia). Payment of the poll tax as a prerequisite for voting in federal elections
had previously been struck down by the 24th Amendment.
116 See HAROLD W. STANLEY, VOTER MOBILIZATION AND THE POLITICS OF RACE: THE SOUTH
AND UNIVERSAL SUFFRAGE, 1952-1984, 27, 94-99, 101-02 nn.26-34 (1987) (noting, however, the
difficulty of identifying a precise statistical measure of the impact of the Act on voter registra-
tion or turnout).
17 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
18 247 F. Supp. 96 (M.D. Ala. 1965).
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state house redistricting plan unconstitutional on two grounds. First
of all, the deviation from population equality was higher than the ten
percent acceptable under the one person, one vote principle, and
there was no rational basis for the deviation.""' The court also found
that the legislature had combined counties in multi-member house
districts so as to minimize the percentage of blacks in any one district
"for the sole purpose of preventing the election of a Negro House
member."'12 Thus the plan was doubly unconstitutional.
One of the three judges who decided Sims was Frank M. Johnson,
the Chief District Judge in the Middle District of Alabama, who
played a role in most of the important civil rights decisions in the
state for a quarter century. He also decided the first lawsuit filed to
challenge local at-large elections as discriminatory vote dilution. In
1966, Fred Gray, the veteran black civil rights lawyer who six years
earlier had successfully attacked the racial gerrymandering of mu-
nicipal boundaries in Tuskegee, Alabama, filed Smith v. Paris.22 In
this case Gray attacked the adoption of at-large elections for the De-
mocratic executive committee of Barbour County, Alabama (George
Wallace's home county). 2' The party committee's defense was that
they shifted to at-large elections because their old districts violated
the one person, one vote principle.2 4 Dismissing this claim as "noth-
ing more than a sham," Judge Johnson pointed out that the commit-
tee could simply have reapportioned its districts.
2 5
The "clear effect" of the change, as demonstrated in the 1966
elections, was that, because black voters comprised a majority of those
registered in some districts but not in the county as a whole, minority
voting strength would be diluted by the bloc votes of the white major-
ity in a county-wide election. The court also relied on the long his-
tory of racial discrimination in Barbour County and the fact that the
change followed the rapid enfranchisement of the county's African-
American citizens by the Voting Rights Act. In light of this factual
pattern, Judge Johnson ruled that the change was motivated by an
unconstitutional racial purpose.
11, Id. at 107-09.
120 The court relied on both Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960), and Fortson v. Dorsey,
379 U.S. 433 (1965).
121 Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. at 340-42.
122 257 F. Supp. 901 (M.D. Ala. 1966), modified and affd, 386 F.2d 979 (5th Cir. 1967).
:23 257 F. Supp. at 902.
124 Id. at 904-05.
125 Id. at 905.
26 The change, wrote Judge Johnson, was "born of an effort to frustrate and discriminate
against Negroes in the exercise of their right to vote, in violation of the Fifteenth Amendment."
Id. at 904. Judge Johnson applied the same methodology for determining intent set forth a
decade later by the Supreme Court in Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Develop-
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Not all federal judges were as sympathetic to the interests of mi-
nority voters as Alabama's Frank Johnson. For this reason African-
American plaintiffs sought to persuade the courts that the pre-
clearance requirements set forth in Section 5 of the Voting Rights
Act, not just the Reconstruction amendments, covered changes with
the potential of diluting minority voting strength. The focus of this
effort was Mississippi legislation authorizing a shift from single-
member districts to at-large elections for county boards of supervisors
and boards of education because, as one state senator put it, "coun-
tywide balloting will safeguard 'a white board' [of supervisors] and
preserve our way of doing business."1 7 The African-American plain-
tiffs contended that under the Voting Rights Act such voting changes
were not legally enforceable without federal preclearance.
12
In 1969 the Supreme Court agreed, ruling in Allen v. State Board of
Elections29 that this Mississippi law, like all other voting changes
adopted in covered jurisdictions, must be submitted either to the At-
torney General or to a three-judge district court in the District of Co-
lumbia, for preclearance. 3" A change from district to at-large voting
for county supervisors could have a discriminatory impact, noted the
Court: "[v]oters who are members of a racial minority might well be
in the majority in one district, but in a decided minority in the county
as a whole."0 1 Under those circumstances, at-large elections could-
if voting patterns followed racial lines-"nullify their ability to elect
the candidate of their choice just as would prohibiting some of them
from voting.' '3 2  The decision in Allen fundamentally altered en-
forcement of the Voting Rights Act.
Even conservative commentator Abigail Thernstrom, who is
sharply critical of the preclearance requirement on theoretical
grounds, concedes that the state laws at issue in Allen were racially
ment Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977). For a fuller account, see McCrary, et al., supra note 114, at 39-
41, 399 nn.16-34.
17 JACKSON CLARION-LEDGER, May 18, 1966, at 1, 16.
128 Plaintiffs' legal strategy is discussed in a letter from Denison Ray to Frank R. Parker, Oct.
22, 1967, cited in U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 2, at 23 n.18. Ray was, in 1967,
Chief Counsel for the Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law (representing some of
the plaintiffs). Parker was the staff counsel for the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights who wrote
much of Political Participation. For a full discussion of the efforts of the 1966 Mississippi legisla-
ture to minimize the effects of the Act, see FRANK R. PARKER, BLACK VOTES COUNT: POLITICAL
EMPOWERMENT IN MississiPPi AFrER 1965, at 34-66, 214-17 (1990).
129 393 U.S. 544 (1969).
130 Id. at 544. Four cases were consolidated in Allen, three from Mississippi. The case involv-
ing at-large elections was styled Fairley v. Patterson; Bunton v. Patterson dealt with a change from
elected to appointed county school superintendents in certain counties; Whitley v. Williams con-
cerned new restrictions on independent candidates. Allen involved restrictions on providing
assistance to illiterate voters. Id. at 550-53.
131 Id. at 569.
132 Id.
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discriminatory in both intent and effect. 3 Yet she argues that the Al-
len decision improperly extended the preclearance requirements of
the Voting Rights Act beyond the intent of the framers in 1965, which
was merely to protect the right of minority voters to enter a polling
booth and pull the lever.'34
It is true that the primary concern of the framers of the Voting
Rights Act in 1965 was, understandably, to protect the right of black
voters to register and cast a ballot. During the hearings, however,
both Attorney General Nicholas Katzenbach and House members
explicitly referred to the racial gerrymander struck down by the Su-
preme Court a few years earlier in Gomillion as one sort of voting
change the preclearance requirement was designed to foil.35 When
Congress voted to extend the Voting Rights Act in 1970 and to ex-
pand its coverage to include language minorities in 1975, it con-
firmed its intent to cover efforts to dilute minority voting strength.'36
As the Supreme Court later put it, "[h]ad Congress disagreed with
the interpretation of [Section] 5 in Allen, it had ample opportunity to
amend the statute."
37
VII. DEVELOPMENT OF THE PRECLEARANCE PROCESS
The effects of Allen were profound. Mississippi, for example, had
to submit the 1966 at-large election statute for preclearance and the
Department of Justice refused to preclear the change.'38 Fourteen
1"Clearly, the Court could not stand by while southern whites in covered states-states with
dirty hands on questions of race-altered electoral rules to buttress white hegemony."
THERNsTROM, supra note 11, at 4. Indeed, she characterizes the decision as "correct." Id. at 29-
30. Yet she also charges that, once the Court "enlarged the definition of enfranchisement" to
include protection against vote dilution, it was on a slippery slope leading to "entitlement" to
proportional representation, "the power, that is, to elect blacks." Id. at 4. This view is reiterated
in STEPHAN THERNSTROM & ABIGAIL THERNSTROM, AMERICA IN BLACK AND WHITE: ONE NATION,
INDIVISIBLE 465-66 (1997).
134 THERNSTROM, supra note 11. In this view Thernstrom follows the reasoning in Justice
John M. Harlan's dissent in Allen, which she believes "incontrovertible." Id. at 24.
Lani Guinier, Keeping the Faith: Black Voters in the Post-Reagan Era, 24 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 393, 401 n.38 (1989); Pamela S. Karlan & Peyton McCrary, Without Fear and Without Re-
search: Abigail Thernstrom on the Voting Rights Act, 4J.L. & POL. 751, 755-57 (1988) (book review).
In the simultaneous debate over the Dirksen amendment, moreover, Senator Robert F. Ken-
nedy of New York referred to use of at-large elections as part of the effort of Southern white
legislators "to keep the Negro a political cripple indefinitely." DIXON, supra note 3, at 408
(quoting 111 CONG. REC. 18616 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1965)).
136 The Nixon administration made a substantial effort to eliminate the preclearance provi-
sions altogether, but was unsuccessful. See THOMAS BYRNE EDSALL & MARY D. EDSALL, CHAIN
REACION: THE IMPACT OF RACE, RIGHTS, AND TAXES ON AMERICAN POLITICS 84 (1991); LAWSON,
IN PURSUIT OF POWER, supra note 6, at 130-51, 154-57.
:7 Georgia v. United States, 411 U.S. 526, 533 (1973).38 Mississippi chose to seek preclearance from the Attorney General, rather than from a
three-judge panel in the District of Columbia. In addition to the fact that the administrative
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Mississippi counties nevertheless tried to switch to at-large supervisor
elections, and another 17 counties to at-large school board elections,
but the Department and, in some cases the federal courts, blocked all
of these efforts.'9 The task of winning constitutional challenges on a
case-by-case basis would have been formidable, and Mississippi was
just one of the covered states.
Administrative reorganization in 1969 produced a separate sec-
tion within the Civil Rights Division specializing in voting rights.
Prodded by liberal critics in Congress, the new Voting Section devel-
oped detailed guidelines for enforcing Section 5 that were, in turn,
endorsed by the Supreme Court. ' The Department's procedures for
enforcing Section 5 were also the subject of numerous unsuccessful
court challenges during the 1970s. 1
In 1971 the Supreme Court ruled that municipal annexations
were among the voting changes covered by the Act.1 4' The Court sub-
route was faster than litigating the issue, the state may have believed that President Nixon's
"Southern strategy" had spawned a climate more sympathetic to the state's racial views than the
more liberal D.C. Circuit. See LAWSON, IN PURSUIT OF POWER, supra note 6, at 162 (explaining
that the District court "Could be expected to guard vigilantly against threats to disenfranchise-
ment."). Two years later the state attempted to re-enact the authorization for county-wide su-
pervisor elections struck down in Allen, and the Attorney General again objected. See also Frank
R. Parker, County Redistricting in Mississippi: Case Studies in Racial Gerrymandering, 44 MISS. L.J.
391, 396 n.32 (1973).
'39 Extension of the Voting Rights Act: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the
Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong. 149 (1975) (testimony of Frank R. Parker); U.S. COMMISSION
ON CIVIL RIGHTS, THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT: TEN YEARS AFTER, 271-72. See also WASHINGTON
RESEARCH PROJECT, THE SHAMEFUL BLIGHT: THE SURVIVAL OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN
VOTING IN THE SOUTH 149-50, 209 (1972); Comment, Mississippi and the Voting Rights Act: 1965-
1982, 52 MISs. L.J. 803, 835-37 (1982).
140 The guidelines are found at 28 C.F.R. § 51. BALL ET AL., supra note 11, at 64-86; Days &
Guinier, supra note 110, at 167-80.
141 See two articles by former Voting Section attorneys: John P. MacCoon, The Enforcement of
the Preclearance Requirement of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 29 CATH. U. L. REV. 107
(1979) (looking at the development of Section 5 litigation and its growing impact); John J. Ro-
man, Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act: The Formation of an Extraordinary Federal Remedy, 22 AM. U. L.
REV. 111 (1972) (discussing the evolution of the remedies provided by Section 5).
142 Perkins v. Matthews, 400 U.S. 379 (1971). In a startling passage, Thernstrom and Thern-
strom claim that
the High Court's few Section 5 decisions are not easy to decipher, and the incoherence
of its rulings released both the Department of Justice and the D.C. court from the con-
fines of principled decision-making. The annexation cases, particularly, left the lower
court and the DOJ free to pick and choose among its disparate elements in muddled ma-
jority opinions.
THERNSTROM & THERNSTROM, supra note 133, at 468. The authority Thernstrom and Thern-
strom cite for this claim is THERNSTROM, supra note 11, at ch.7. Perhaps court decisions in gen-
eral are "not easy to decipher," but it is the job of lawyers, and those who write about the law, to
decipher them anyway. Section 5 case law is no harder to decipher than any other body of
court opinions. See Hiroshi Motomura, Preclearance Under Section Five of the Voting Rights Act, 61
N.C. L. REV. 189, 221-32 (1983) (reviewing the case law regarding preclearance review of an-
nexations and consolidations, as well as the effort of the Department to act as a surrogate for
the D.C. court).
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sequently decided that municipalities facing Departmental objections
to annexations which had the discriminatory effect of reducing the
black or Hispanic percentage within the city could overcome that ob-
jection by adopting an election plan that fairly reflected minority vot-
ing strength for the enlarged city, normally a single member district
system. 43 Otherwise such cities would likely be condemned to declin-
ing tax revenues, as well-off whites moved to nearby suburbs to escape
racial integration. As a result, departmental objections to annexa-
tions played a significant role in persuading Southern municipalities
to give up at-large elections. 44
The Court's first major restriction on the scope of the Act was an-
nounced in its 1976 decision, Beer v. United States,'45 in which the city
of New Orleans sought a declaratory judgment preclearing its redis-
tricting plan. The three-judge trial court refused, on the grounds
that under current Supreme Court doctrine the plan diluted minority
voting strength.'46 The majority in Beer reversed the trial court, how-
ever, ruling that the term "effect" has a different meaning under Sec-tion5 tan uderthe . 147
tion 5 than under the Constitution. The Court determined that, in
the context of a preclearance review, "effect" is to be defined as "ret-
rogression," a newly minted term to describe changes that place mi-
nority voters in a worse position than under the status quo.4  Amelio-
rative changes that. do not make matters worse for minority voters
are, under Beer, not discriminatory in effect.
49
143 City of Richmond v. United States, 422 U.S. 358 (1975); City of Petersburg v. United
States, 354 F. Supp. 1021, 1023-24 (D.D.C. 1972), aff'd, 410 U.S. 962 (1973). City of Richmond's
dissenting Justices-Brennan, Marshall, and Douglas-would not have precleared the Rich-
mond annexation because
[t]he record is replete with statements by Richmond officials which prove beyond ques-
tion that the predominant (if not the sole) motive and desire of the negotiators of the
1969 settlement was to acquire 44,000 additional white citizens for Richmond, in order
to avert a transfer of political control to what was fast becoming a black population ma-
jority.
422 U.S. at 382. For ample evidence of this racial purpose, see JOHN V. MOESER & RUTLEDGE M.
DENNIS, THE POLITICS OF ANNEXATION: OLIGARCHIC POWER IN A SOUTHERN CITY 88-93, 98-102,
107-09 (1982). Newly appointed Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. abstained from the City of Richmond
decision because he had earlier sought to persuade the Attorney General to preclear the an-
nexation. Letter from Justice Powell toJohn N. Mitchell (Aug. 9, 1971) (on file with U. S. Dep't
ofJustice).
144 During the years 1975-80, for example, annexations accounted for the largest single type
of voting change to which the Department of Justice objected, and most were withdrawn only
when the municipality switched from at-large to single-member district elections. U.S.
COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT: UNFULFILLED GOALS 65, 69 tbl.6.4
(1981).
145 425 U.S. 130 (1976).
146 The trial court, throughout its opinion, 374 F. Supp. 363 (D.D.C. 1974), relied on White v.
Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973), and other vote dilution cases decided on constitutional grounds.
147 Beer, 425 U.S. 130.
148 Id. at 141.
149 Id. at 14142.
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On the other hand, Beer did not affect the purpose prong of Sec-
tion 5.15o "Even without retrogression, a covered jurisdiction will vio-
late [S]ection 5 if an impermissible racial purpose is behind an elec-
toral change," explains conservative legal scholar James F.
Blumstein. 5 F As the Beer majority put it in a key passage: "We con-
clude, therefore, that such an ameliorative new legislative appor-
tionment cannot violate [Section] 5 unless the new apportionment it-
self so discriminates on the basis of race or color as to violate the
Constitution."1 5 This wording appears understandable only as a refer-
ence to the purpose test in Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendment
cases. 1 5  The reference to a constitutional violation could not refer to
a dilutive effects test because, in endorsing the retrogression concept
the Beer majority had rejected a dilutive effects test as inapplicable in
the Section 5 context.' As a result, federal courts interpreted this
wording in Beer as referring to a constitutional "purpose" test for the
next quarter-century.
1 55
Both the complexity involved in measuring retrogression and, by
contrast, the straightforwardness of applying the purpose standard
are exemplified by the decision in a Section 5 declaratory judgment
action filed by a Georgia county, Wilkes County v. United States.15  The
case involved a change from single-member districts to an at-large
plan in the early 1970s for both county commission and school
150 Because the trial court decided the case on the grounds that the redistricting plan had a
dilutive effect, it did not reach the issue of whether the change had a discriminatory intent. 374
F. Supp. at 387. Thus the only issue before the Supreme Court was whether the lower court's
ruling under the Section 5 effect standard was correct.
151 Blumstein, supra note 8, at 685. In contrast, Thernstrom claims that "the Justice Depart-
ment all but ignored Beer," not recognizing that Beer left the Section 5 purpose prong intact.
THERNSTROM, supra note 11, at 169.
15 Beer, 425 U.S. at 141 (emphasis added).
153 In a landmark decision effectively eliminating the purpose prong of Section 5, Justice An-
tonin Scalia, writing for the Court, rejects this assessment of the above wording from Beer: "We
think that a most implausible interpretation. At the time Beer was decided, it had not been es-
tablished that discriminatory purpose as well as discriminatory effect was necessary for a consti-
tutional violation." Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 528 U.S. 320, 337 (2000) [hereinafter Boss-
ierll]. It is true that it was three months after deciding Beerbefore the Supreme Court ruled in
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976), that evidence of discriminatory intent was necessary to
proving a Fourteenth Amendment violation. But according to the Supreme Court in City of Mo-
bile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980), and Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613 (1982), the test set forth in
White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973) did, in fact, require proof of discriminatory intent. As
noted below, the evidence on this point is ambiguous-too ambiguous to support Justice
Scalia's interpretation of this key issue.
14 In my view,Justice Scalia's analysis in Bossier II ignores this critical fact. See supra note 153
and accompanying text.
155 See, e.g., City of Pleasant Grove v. United States, 479 U.S. 462, 471-72 (1987); City of Port
Arthur v. United States, 459 U.S. 159, 168 (1982).
156 450 F. Supp. 1171 (D.C. 1978), affd, 439 U.S. 999 (1978). A covered jurisdiction may seek
preclearance by filing a declaratory judgement action before a three-judge panel in the District
of Columbia district court.
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board. The evidence showed that voting patterns were racially polar-
ized and that, as a result, no black candidates had been elected to ei-
ther governing body despite the fact that African-Americans made up
47 percent of the county's population.' 7 The county claimed that
under the retrogression standard the at-large system had no discrimi-
natory effect because blacks did not form a majority of the registered
voters in any of the old districts, which, it admitted, were badly
malapportioned.'
58
The court, noting that the low level of black voter registration was
itself a function of historical discrimination, found that even under
the old districts minority voters had more influence on the outcome of
the elections than under the at-large system. ' 9 Moreover, in the
court's view the correct benchmark was a properly apportioned-and
"fairly drawn"-system of single member districts, and such a plan
could have been drawn to include a 71 percent black district (which
would have given black voters an equal opportunity to elect a candi-
date of their choice).'6°  In either event, the court decided, the
change was retrogressive.'61
Applying the constitutional purpose standard, the court observed
that the change to at-large elections followed a substantial increase in
minority voter registration after the Voting Rights Act.'16 No African-
Americans had either served as Democratic party officials in this one-
party county or been appointed to fill vacancies for elected offices. 3
Nor had any black citizens been consulted about the decision to
adopt an at-large plan.' 4 The county claimed that the purpose of the
change was solely to satisfy the one person, one vote requirement, but
the court found that argument a mere pretext; the districts could
simply have been equalized in population after the 1970 census. In
light of these circumstances, the county failed both purpose and ret-
rogression tests and was not entitled to preclearance. "
The Department's implementation of Section 5 evolved in direct
response to federal court orders and statutory requirements. In de-
ciding whether to preclear or object to voting changes, the Depart-
ment acts as a surrogate for three-judge district courts in the District
17 Id. at 1174-75.
58 See id. at 1176 (discussing claims made by Wilkes County).
159 Id. at 1177.
1W Id. at 1175.
l6 See id. at 1175-76. The Supreme Court's affirmation indicates that this view was consistent
with Beer's understanding of retrogression.
162 Id. at 1176.
163 Id. at 1174-75.
I1 d. at 1175.
165 See id. at 1174-76 (holding that the county's scheme could not be maintained). See also
Hale County v. United States, 496 F. Supp. 1206 (D.D.C. 1980) (holding that at-large elections
for county commissioners had purpose and effect of abridging right to vote on basis of race).
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of Columbia, to which the Voting Rights Act also assigns preclearance
responsibility.' 6  Contrary to the claim of earlier studies, the Depart-
ment's attorneys do not "bargain" or "negotiate" with submitting ju-
risdictions when conducting preclearance reviews. 167 Both public of-
ficials and minority citizens have an opportunity to present comments
regarding voting changes, but the decision-making is designed to fol-
low the dictates of current Section 5 case law. 68  Thus the Depart-
ment's administrative review under Section 5 can properly be charac-
terized as a quasi-judicial process of implementation.
VIII. VOTING RIGHTS UNDER THE RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS
In the 1970s vote-dilution lawsuits were decided under a constitu-
tional standard set forth by a unanimous Supreme Court in a legisla-
tive redistricting case from Texas, White v. egester.169 The decision
struck down the use of multi-member districts to elect members of
1701
the state house of representatives in Dallas and Bexar counties.
The Court's opinion relied on evidence of a history of official dis-
crimination against blacks in Dallas and Hispanics in Bexar; cultural
and language barriers in Bexar and a discriminatory slating group in
Dallas; a lack of responsiveness by elected officials to the needs of the
minority community; and the use of numbered place and runoff re-
quirements which enhance the discriminatory potential of at-large
166 See Supplementary Submissions Rule, 28 C.F.R. § 1.39 (2003) (stating that the responsibil-
ity to act as a surrogate for the D.C. court is set forth in the Department's Section 5 guidelines
at 28 C.F.R. 51.39).
167 SeeBALLETAL., supra note 11, at 25, 100, 111, 116, 130, 136-37, 140, 145-46, 199 (describ-
ing that negotiation and compromise with jurisdiction officials often served to weaken the De-
partment's voting rights enforcement); Lorn S. Foster, Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act: Implemen-
tation of an Administrative Remedy, PUBLIUS, Fall 1986, at 17, 22, 26-27 (indicating that no one is
advocating for interest of minorities and the process is not working in their best interest).
168 This view is contradicted by Graham who pictures enforcement of Section 5 as a form of
what he calls "the new social regulation," in which Voting Section attorneys are "captured" by a
civil rights clientele much as economic regulators are typically captured by business, farmer, or
labor groups. See Graham, supra note 11, at 179-80, 185, 187, 192. Similarly, Thernstrom char-
acterizes Justice Department attorneys as civil rights activists who "invent law as they enforce it."
See THERNSTROM, supra note 11, at 236.
169 412 U.S. 755 (1973).
170 See id. at 765-70. The case involved both malapportionment and racial vote dilution. See
id. at 756 (discussing the questions before the court). The trial court had ruled that the redis-
tricting plan, with a total deviation of 9.9 percent, violated the one person, one vote standard.
See Graves v. Barnes, 343 F. Supp. 704, 713, 717, 723-24 (W.D. Tex., 1972) (holding there was no
justification for the deviation). The Supreme Court reversed in part, on the grounds that, ex-
cept for congressional districts, where different constitutional provisions were at stake, devia-
tions of less than 10 percent were acceptable-a ruling from which three liberal justices dis-
sented. See White, 412 U.S. at 763-64, 772-82 (holding the district court's ruling of a prima facie
violation was in error).
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elections. 7 Based on what it called "the totality of the circum-
stances,"'72 the Court found that minority voters in these two counties
had "less opportunity than did other residents . . . to participate in
the [electoral] processes and to elect [candidates] of their choice."'73
Although in later decisions the Supreme Court interpreted White
as incorporating an intent requirement, the majority opinion in the
case did not state explicitly that proof of discriminatory intent was re-
quired under the totality of circumstances test.14 The Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals, which handled by far the largest number of vote-
dilution cases in the 1970s, initially treated the test as requiring proof
of either purpose or effect, but not both, in deciding a Louisiana chal-
lenge to at-large elections in East Carroll Parish, Louisiana, Zimmer v.
McKeithen.1
7
1
Under this approach, plaintiffs in vote dilution cases were often
able to win by documenting a history of racial segregation and dis-
crimination in the jurisdiction and by showing that, due to racially
polarized voting, the election system operated in such a way that mi-
nority voters did not have a reasonable opportunity to elect represen-
tatives of their choice. 76 The lower courts understood how to apply
the standard because it was, as one commentator describes it, "flexi-
ble, fact-specific, precise, and workable.' ' 77  Veteran Fifth Circuit
171 Id. at 766-69.
172 Id. at 769.
173 Id. at 766. Previously, African-American plaintiffs had lost a challenge to the use of at-
large elections for the Indiana legislature because that state lacked the history of racial dis-
crimination or discriminatory slating present in Texas, leading the Court to conclude that,
unlike in Texas, minority candidates lost because they ran as Democrats and not because they
were black. See Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 153-55 (1971). In addition, the plaintiffs
conceded there was no evidence of racially discriminatory intent. See id. at 153-54.
174 In City of Mobilev. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980), and Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613 (1982), the
Supreme Court subsequently found that White required proof of discriminatory intent. Blum-
stein observes that the wording in White supports both the view that proof of discriminatory in-
tent is necessary and that it is not. See Blumstein, supra note 8, at 669-70.
175 485 F.2d 1297 (5th Cir. 1973) (en banc), affd sub nom. E. Carroll Parish Sch. Bd. v. Mar-
shall, 424 U.S. 636 (1976). As the majority opinion stated, plaintiffs must maintain the burden
of showing that a plan was either "a racially motivated gerrymander" or that it "would operate to
minimize or cancel out the voting strength of racial or political elements of the voting popula-
tion." Id. at 1304 (citing Howard v. Adams County Bd. of Supervisors, 453 F.2d 455, 457-58 (5th
Cir. 1972)). Because plaintiffs here met the second standard, it was not necessary for the court
to rule on the initial purpose prong of the test. See Zimmer, 485 F.2d at 1304.
176 See Zimmer, 485 F.2d at 1308-09. See also Blacksher & Menefee, supra note 8, at 18-26 (de-
scribing the development of a standard for plaintiffs in vote dilution cases); McCrary, supra note
20, at 510-14 (explaining the statistical procedures used in these cases to measure the degree of
racial bloc voting); Timothy C. O'Rourke, Constitutional and Statutory Challenges to Local At-Large
Elections, 17 U. RICH. L. REv. 39, 51-57, 78-81 (Fall 1982) (discussing the move from an intent
standard to a "results" standard).
177 Frank R. Parker, The 'Results' Test of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act: Abandoning the Intent
Standard, 69 VA. L. REv. 715, 725 (1983) (detailing the shift from an intent to a results based
standard for Section 2 violations).
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Judge Irving Goldberg later characterized the standard as "a juris-
prudence produced by ten years of struggle and compromise be-
tween judges of varying political and jurisprudential backgrounds."""8
These cases were brought by a new generation of voting rights
lawyers, mostly white and many of them Southerners, who devoted a
significant part of their careers to litigation on behalf of African-
American voters. The Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under
Law maintained an office in Jackson, Mississippi, and under the lead-
ership of Frank R. Parker brought most of the cases in that state; in
the 1980s Parker, then based in the national office, litigated a num-
ber of important Virginia cases. The American Civil Liberties Union
maintained an office in Atlanta where Laughlin McDonald, Neil
Bradley, and Christopher Coates focused on problems in Georgia
and South Carolina. Armand Derfner, working with the Lawyers'
Constitutional Defense Committee and the national office of the
Lawyers' Committee, tried Mississippi and Virginia cases and, as a pri-
vate attorney in Charleston, litigated a number of South Carolina law-
suits. James U. Blacksher, Larry Menefee, and Edward Still brought
most of the Alabama cases, and a few Florida lawsuits, as cooperating
attorneys of the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund.
Stanley Halpin, usually as a cooperating attorney of the Lawyers'
Committee, brought most of the Louisiana cases. A private law firm
headed by Julius Chambers and Adam Stein, usually cooperating with
the Legal Defense Fund, handled many of the North Carolina law-
suits. In the 1980s Lani Guinier from the Legal Defense Fund's na-
tional office litigated vote dilution cases in Louisiana, Alabama,
North Carolina, and Arkansas. Justice Department lawyers brought
cases throughout the South; the Voting Section's most productive
litigator over the years was J. Gerald Hebert. This new voting rights
bar developed expertise in voting rights case law that gave minority
plaintiffs a valuable edge over defendants at trial."
In 1980, the Supreme Court ruled in City of Mobile v. Bolden, a chal-
lenge to that city's use of at-large elections, that plaintiffs must prove
not only that the at-large system has a discriminatory effect due to
racially polarized voting but also that it was adopted or maintained
for the purpose of diluting minority voting strength.8 ' The Court
178 J ones v. City of Lubbock, 640 F.2d 777 (5th Cir. 1981).
See Gregory A. Caldeira, Litigation, Lobbying, and the Voting Rights Bar, in GROFMAN &
DAVIDSON, CONTROVERSIES IN MINORITY VOTING, supra note 11, at 230-35. The names of all at-
torneys on a case are listed in each published court opinion; this is the principal basis for my
knowledge of the careers of attorneys discussed in the text above.
180 See City of Mobile, 446 U.S. at 66 (requiring proof of intent as well as a more difficult stan-
dard for inferring racial purpose through circumstantial evidence). Although supported by only
a plurality, Justice Potter Stewart's opinion was the prevailing view on the Court. See also
O'Rourke, supra note 176, at 56-57 (describing how the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals had an-
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remanded the case, and a companion suit challenging at-large school
board elections in Mobile County, for a new trial on the intent ques-
tion. The plaintiffs prevailed under the intent standard, after dem-
onstrating that a racial purpose lay behind shifts to at-large elections
in 1876 and 1911, but at great cost.""
In the view of many observers, the Mobile decision was inconsistent
with the intent of Congress when it adopted and expanded the Vot-
ing Rights Act in 1965, 1970, and 1975. A substantial majority in both
houses revised Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act in 1982 to outlaw
election methods that result in diluting minority voting strength,
without requiring proof of discriminatory intent.l2 In creating a new
statutory means of attacking minority vote dilution, Congress cited
the "totality of circumstances" test of White and Zimmer as the eviden-
tiary standard to be used in applying the Section 2 results test. Vote-
dilution cases previously decided under the Fourteenth Amendment
would henceforth be tried under the new statutory standard.'83
Even so, in a few complex lawsuits in the 1980s evidence of dis-
criminatory intent proved critical to the court's decision, most dra-
matically in one Alabama case, Dillard v. Crenshaw County, which led
to the elimination of at-large elections in more than 180 counties,
municipalities, and school boards.8 4 The plaintiffs presented histori-
cal evidence showing that whenever black voting strength was sub-
stantial state and local officials had a policy of using at-large rather
than district elections, and that in the 1950s and 1960s the state, mo-
tivated explicitly by the goal of preventing the election of blacks to
ticipated the intent requirement in Nevett v. Sides, 571 F.2d 209 (5th Cir. 1978), Bolden v. City of
Mobile, 571 F.2d 238 (5th Cir. 1978), Blacks United for Lasting Leadership v. City of Shreveport, 571
F.2d 248 (5th Cir. 1978), and Thomasville Branch of NAACP v. Thomas County, 571 F.2d 257 (5th
Cir. 1978)).
181 See Bolden v. City of Mobile, 542 F. Supp. 1050 (S.D. Ala. 1982) (holding at-large plan vio-
lated Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments and finding discriminatory intent and effects);
Brown v. Board of Sch. Comm'rs of Mobile County, 542 F. Supp. 1078 (S.D. Ala. 1982). See also
Peyton McCrary, History in the Courts: The Significance of City of Mobile v. Bolden, in DAVIDSON ED.,
MINORITYVOTE DILUTION, supra note 20, at 47-63.
182 SeeThomas M. Boyd & StephenJ. Markman, The 1982 Amendments to the Voting Rights Act: A
Legislative History, 40 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1347 (1983) (describing how the 1982 amendments
changed the Voting Rights Act); Armand Derfner, Vote Dilution and the Voting Rights Act Amend-
ments of 1982, in DAVIDSON ED., MINORITY VOTE DILUTION, supra note 20, at 145-63 (reviewing
the struggle to pass the new amendments to the Voting Rights Act); Parker, supra note 177, at
725. See also THERNSTROM, supra note 11, at 79-136 (arguing that Congress was misguided in
adopting a results test because she favors an intent standard).
183 See Blacksher & Menefee, supra note 8, at 31-32; McDonald, supra note 104, at 1265.
184 See Dillard v. Crenshaw County, 640 F. Supp. 1347 (M.D. Ala. 1986). See also McCrary et
al., supra note 114, at 54-64 (describing the effects of the court's decision in changing from at-
large district elections to district elections in Alabama).
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office, adopted laws requiring the use of anti-single shot devices in all
jurisdictions to enhance the dilutive power of at-large elections.
s5
IX. THE IMPACT OF THE SECTION 2 RESULTS TEST
In the decade following the revision of Section 2, voting rights
lawyers successfully brought numerous lawsuits under the new results
standard. The Supreme Court made clear in Thornburg v. Gingles,
that minority plaintiffs could win by showing that: 1) the minority
group is sufficiently numerous and geographically concentrated so
that a majority-minority district can be drawn; 2) minority citizens
vote cohesively; and 3) that the racial majority votes as a bloc to the
degree that minority candidates usually lose.8 6 Once this pattern was
clear, many defendants settled before trial and went to single-
member districts.18
7
Scholarly research on the impact of the Voting Rights Act in the
South demonstrates that the substantial increases in minority repre-
sentation since 1970 are due primarily to the elimination of at-large
elections and other devices that can dilute minority voting strength."
s
8
185 See McCrary & Hebert, supra note 41, at 118-21 (summarizing the evidence). The most
colorful evidence was a speech by a member of the State Democratic Executive Committee ex-
plaining that without an anti-single shot law or a numbered place requirement, "it would be
easy under the single shot voting for all of them to come in, to put a scalawag or put a negro
[sic] in there." He complained about "increasing Federal pressure to ... register negroes [sic]
en masse, regardless of ... their criminal records." In one black belt county "where there were
very few darkies [sic] registered, there has probably increased 4 or 5 hundred percent already,"
he claimed. In such a context "it has occurred to a great many people, including the legislature
of Alabama, that there should be numbered places." See also Peyton McCrary, Discriminatory In-
tent: The Continuing Relevance of "Purpose" Evidence in Vote-Dilution Lawsuits, 28 HOW. LJ. 463
(1985) (discussing other cases where intent evidence was important during the 1980s).
1s6 Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986), affg in part, rev'g in part Gingles v. Edmisten,
590 F. Supp. 345 (E.D.N.C. 1984). These three criteria provide a threshold test. Once satisfied,
plaintiffs still have to satisfy the "totality of the circumstances" test of White v. Regester.
187 See generally DAVIDSON & GROFMAN, QUIET REVOLUTION IN THE SOUTH, supra note 4, at 35-
36, 84, 120-21, 143, 171-73, 210-12, 247, 256, 284-87 (documenting the numerous redistricting
plans resulting from settlements of Section 2 claims).
188 See Pildes, supra note 13, at 1362-76 (summarizing the findings of DAVIDSON & GROFMAN,
QUIET REVOLUTION IN THE SOUTH, supra note 4, and relating them to voting rights case law as
of the mid-1990s). As Pildes observes, these findings provide more definitive proof of the con-
ventional view among political scientists that at-large elections serve as a significant barrier to
minority representation). See generally ALBERT K. KARNIG & SUSAN WELCH, BLACK
REPRESENTATION AND URBAN POLICY (1980); Chandler Davidson & George Korbel, At-Large Elec-
tions and Minority Group Representation: A Re-Examination of Historical and Contemporary Evidence, 43
J. POL. 982 (1981); Richard L. Engstrom & Michael D. McDonald, The Election of Blacks to City
Councils: Clarifying the Impact of Electoral Arrangements on the Seats/Population Relationship, 75 AM.
POL. Sci. REV. 344 (1981); Clinton B. Jones, The Impact of Local Election Systems on Black Political
Participation, 11 URB. AFF. Q. 345 (1976) (examining research on the impact of at-large systems
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Fairly drawn single-member district plans have provided an opportu-
nity for African-American or Hispanic voters to elect candidates of
their choice in districts where they constitute a majority of the voting
population. The trend was almost as dramatic in jurisdictions that
switched from at-large elections to mixed plans including a few at-
large seats. In many localities the level of black representation by
1990 approached the black percentage of the population in the juris-
diction.m9 Very few African-Americans were elected to council seats
from white-majority districts. On the other hand, virtually all black-
majority districts elected black council members.19
Nor are these results surprising to those familiar with the evidence
of racial polarization produced in the hundreds of vote-dilution law-
suits tried or settled in the last quarter century. No court has ever
found a violation in a voting rights case absent proof, typically pre-
sented through expert statistical analysis, that white or Anglo voters
routinely defeat the candidates of choice of minority voters.' 9' As a
on black political participation); Albert K. Karnig, Black Representation on City Councils: The Impact
of District Elections and Socioeconomic Factors, 12 URB. AFF. Q. 223-42 (1976) (considering the de-
terminants of black political representation); Margaret B. Latimer, Black Political Representation
in Southern Cities: Election Systems and Other Causal Variables, 15 URB. AFF. Q. 65, 65-86 (1979)
(studying how black representation in city government is influenced by election systems and
socioeconomic variables).
189 But see Grofman, supra note 5, at 145 (pointing out that, as political scientists and political
geographers have long understood, single member district plans imperfectly optimize minority
voting strength and are often quite far from proportionality). See also PEGGY HEILIG & ROBERTJ.
MUNDT, YOUR VOICE AT CITY HALL: THE POLITICS, PROCEDURES, AND POLICIES OF DISTRICT
REPRESENTATION (1984); Theodore S. Arrington & Thomas G. Watts, The Election of Blacks to
School Boards in North Carolina, W. POL. Q. 1099, 1099-1105 (1991); Charles S. Bullock, Section 2
of the Voting Rights Act, Districting Formats, and the Election of African Americans, 56 J. POL. 1098
(1994), 1098-1105 (all showing that single member districts usually provide far greater repre-
sentation for minority voters than do at-large elections). Two recent longitudinal studies by
economists using advanced regression models confirm a continuing, though diminished, dis-
criminatory effect to the use of at-large elections. Tim R. Sass & S.L. Mehay, The Voting Rights
Act, District Elections, and the Success of Black Candidates in Municipal Elections, 38 J.L. & ECON. 367
(1995); Tim R. Sass & BobbyJ. Pittman,Jr., The Changing Impact of Electoral Structure on Black Rep-
resentation in the South, 1970-1996, 102 PUB. CHOICE 369 (2000).
190 See DAVIDSON & GROFMAN, QUIET REVOLUTION IN THE SOUTH, supra note 4, at tbls.2.3, 2.7,
3.3, 3.7, 4.3, 4.3A, 4.7A, 5.3, 5.7, 6.3, 6.3A, 6.7, 6.7A, 7.3, 7.3A, 8.3, 8.7, 9.3, 9.7, 10.4, and 10.5
(showing black representation in heavily black districts).
191 Abigail Thernstrom ignores this fundamental fact, claiming incorrectly that "[t] he major-
ity-white county, city, or district in which whites vote as a solid bloc against any minority candi-
date is now unusual." THERNSTROM, supra note 11, at 243. She also believes that blacks should
in many cases be willing to settle for the fact that they "become a powerful swing vote when
white candidates begin to compete." Id. at 23. When Thernstrom discusses specific evidence of
racially polarized voting presented in vote-dilution lawsuits (as in her discussion of the findings
in Thornburg, at 207-08, 216), she often gets the facts wrong. See e.g. Karlan & McCrary, supra
note 135, at 759 n.53 (critiquing Thernstrom's discussion of the findings in Thornburg v. Gingles
in THERNSTROM, supra note 11, at 207-08, 216). Pildes contends that, because of Thernstrom's
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result, the only way to provide minority voters with a fair opportunity
to elect their preferred representatives was to order a change to dis-
trict elections or some alternative remedy. By 1990 the few at-large
systems left in the South were primarily located in jurisdictions where
white cross-over voting had resulted in a pattern of sign ificant minor-
ity representation, thus making litigation unnecessary. Increasingly,
therefore, the focus of voting rights activists would be on the degree
to which districting plans adopted earlier fairly reflected minority vot-
ing strength.
X. ASSESSING THE VIABILITY OF DISTRICTING PLANS
Before 1990, only a handful of vote dilution challenges were filed
against single-member district plans.9 The use of racial gerryman-
dering in redistricting was most often found in the context of pre-
clearance reviews under Section 5. In the first 30 years after adoption
of the Voting Rights Act in 1965, the Department of Justice reviewed
around 270,000 changes in voting and precleared all but about one
percent. Among the most controversial types of change is redis-
tricting. Over the years the Department has objected to less than
seven percent of all the redistricting plans submitted for review.
Quite naturally, the rate of objections was greater in the early years of
enforcement. For the years 1971-1974, the Attorney General refused
to preclear roughly 14 percent of the plans; from 1981-1984 the rate
was approximately eight percent; for the most recent period, 1991-
indifference to the empirical evidence of racially polarized voting, judges and justices who rely
on her for evidence on this subject are misguided. See Pildes, supra note 13, at 1365-67.
192 At first glance, Susan Welch appears to show that at-large elections no longer have a ra-
cially discriminatory effect. See Susan Welch, The Impact of At-Large Elections on the Representation
of Blacks and Hispanics, 52 J. POL. 1050 (1990). Welch's sample of cities seems, however, to re-
flect what is known in statistics as a "selection bias." Particularly in the South, many at-large sys-
tems that had diluted minority voting strength in the past have, in many cases as a result of liti-
gation, now shifted to single-member districts or mixed plans, leaving only a few at-large systems
in jurisdictions where racially polarized voting may have been less pronounced than usual. See
Bernard Grofman & Chandler Davidson, The Effect of Municipal Election Structure on Black Repre-
sentation in Eight Southern States, in DAVIDSON & GROFMAN, QUIET REVOLUTION IN THE SOUTH,
supra note 4, at 320-21 (arguing for the continuing importance of the Voting Rights Act to pro-
tect minority rights of representation).
19 But see Ketchum v. Byrne, 740 F.2d 1398 (7th Cir. 1984); Major v. Treen, 574 F. Supp. 325
(E.D. La. 1983); Rybicki v. State Bd. of Elections, 574 F. Supp. 1082 (N.D. Ill. 1982); Kirksey v.
Bd. of Supervisors of Hinds County, 402 F. Supp. 658 (S.D. Miss. 1975), affd, 528 F.2d 536 (5th
Cir. 1976), rev'd, 554 F.2d 139 (5th Cir. 1977) (en banc).
194 Mark A. Posner, Post-1990 Redistrictings and the Preclearance Requirement of Section 5 of the Vot-
ing Rights Act - A Perspective from the Justice Department, in WAYNE ARDEN ET AL., RACE AND
REDISTRICTING IN THE 1990S 80, 88-89 (Mark A. Posner ed., 1998). These numbers were calcu-
lated as of July 1, 1995; Posner was then an attorney with the Voting Section.
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1994, the Department objected to only around seven percent.95 In
order to overcome these objections, states and localities necessarily
adopted fair single-member district plans under which minority vot-
ers have gained a reasonable opportunity to elect candidates of their
choice.
In evaluating a redistricting plan, there are two distinct quantita-
tive issues. First, do the districts identified by the submitting author-
ity as majority-minority districts actually afford minority voters a rea-
sonable or fair opportunity to elect candidates of their choice; are
they electorally viable? Second, does the plan minimize the number
of effective majority-minority districts? A redistricting plan may
minimize the number of majority-minority districts either by "pack-
ing" an unnecessarily high percentage of minority citizens (say 80 or
90 percent) into a single district or by fragmenting minority popula-
tion concentrations so that the group's members are dispersed
among several majority-white districts.'96
Because black and Hispanic populations typically contain a high
percentage of persons under the age of 18, the proportion of a dis-
trict's voting-age population belonging to that group is usually lower
than its percentage of the total population. Because minority citizens
are typically registered at a lower rate than those of the majority
community, the group normally forms a smaller proportion of the
registered voters than of the voting-age population. Because minority
voters, who are often significantly lower in socio-economic status and
educational background, frequently turn out a lower rate than in the
majority community, they often make up a smaller percentage of the
turnout than of the registered voters.' 97
Recognizing those facts, the federal courts in the 1970s came up
with a rule of thumb often dubbed "the 65 percent rule."'98 As minor-
ity registration and turnout rates have increased, often to a point ap-
proaching parity with whites, experts often recommend districts with
a smaller percentage of minority population. And where a substantial
percentage of white voters have demonstrated a regular tendency to
195 Id. Posner's numbers and percentages are approximate, but they are the best available
data.
196 Motomura, supra note 142, at 233-36; Frank R. Parker, Racial Gerrymandering and Legislative
Reapportionment in MINORITY VOTE DILUTION, supra note 20, at 85-117.
197 BERNARD GROFMAN ET AL., MINORITY REPRESENTATION AND THE QUEST FOR VOTING
EQUALITY 116-21 (1992).
198 See generally Kirksey v. Bd. of Supervisors of Hinds County, 554 F.2d 139 (5th Cir. 1977)
(en banc), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 968 (1977); Moore v. Leflore County Bd. of Election Comm'rs,
502 F.2d 621 (5th Cir. 1974); Mississippi v. United States, 490 F. Supp. 569 (D.D.C. 1979), affd,
444 U.S. 1050 (1980).
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support minority candidates, the minority threshold can be lowered
accordingly.' 99 For these reasons the Department of Justice and the
courts assess district composition on a case-by-case basis. 00
Both before and after the Beer decision, discriminatory purpose as
defined in constitutional cases played a significant role in the De-
partment's review of redistricting plans. In assessing the issue of ra-
cially discriminatory purpose, a major issue is whether authorities
have rejected alternative districting plans that would provide minority
voters a better opportunity to elect candidates of their choice. The
courts and the Justice Department also focus on whether minority
citizens were excluded from the redistricting process, or if their re-
quests for alternative plans are rejected without substantial justifica-
tion, and whether there is a departure from usual redistricting prac-
tices or criteria.'°1
The Assistant Attorney General whose Section 5 objections played
a key role in advancing minority representation during the 1980s was,
ironically, W. Bradford Reynolds, the conservative Republican whom
Ronald Reagan had named to lead the Civil Rights Division away
from the policies of the 1970s. Legal theorist Abigail Thernstrom has
criticized Reynolds for objecting to changes that were not retrogres-
sive merely because they failed to maximize minority voting strength,
using proportional representation as his standard. "Indeed," she
writes, "it is hard to imagine a Civil Rights Division more responsive
to the demands of minority and civil rights spokesmen with respect to
districting than that headed by William Bradford Reynolds."' '
Raymond Wolters, a conservative historian whose views on most
civil rights issues are consistent with those of Thernstrom, has de-
fended Reynolds emphatically against this charge. Reynolds, he
points out correctly, was just "a lawyer who recognized that when it
came to electoral districting, both Congress and the Supreme Court
had rejected the argument that race-conscious districting was per se
unconstitutional" in favor of the view that it was necessary to take race
into account in districting in order "to facilitate the election of mem-
bers of unrepresented racial groups."02 In short, in the numerous in-
19 AllanJ. Lichtman &J. Gerald Hebert, A General Theory of Vote Dilution, 6 LA RAZA LJ. 1, 10-
19 (1993).
200 GROFMAN ETAL., supra note 197, at 120.
201 Days & Guinier, supra note 110, at 170-71; Grofman, supra note 5, at 78 n.5; Motomura,
suPr2a note 142, at 238-39, 241.
202 THERNSTROM, supra note 11, at 170.
203 RAYMOND WOLTERS, RIGHT TURN: WILLIAM BRADFORD REYNOLDS, THE REAGAN
ADMINISTRATION, AND BLACK CIVIL RIGHTS 131-35 (1996). Reynolds' own views are reflected in
his congressional testimony in 1982 against the creation of a Section 2 results test. See Voting
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stances where Reynolds objected to voting changes, usually under the
intent prong of Section 5, he was simply following the dictates of
relevant case law as set forth by the federal courts.
In broad quantitative terms, the administration of Section 5 under
Reynolds appears comparable to both predecessors and successors.
The Department objected to approximately eight percent of all redis-
tricting plans submitted from 1981 through 1984, a bit over half the
percentage in the 1970s but slightly more than the seven percent of
redistricting plans to which objections were interposed in the 1990s.
Looked at in terms of absolute numbers, there were almost twice as
many objections in the 1980s round of redistricting, because far more
plans were submitted for preclearance review than in the 1970s (and
the number of objections in the 1990s was correspondingly greater
than in the 1980s).0 4
On the other hand, there were also instances in which Reynolds
precleared voting changes to which staff attorneys had recommended
objections.0 5 The best known example is his decision to preclear a
congressional redistricting plan in Louisiana later found by a federal
court to violate the Section 2 results test, despite strong evidence in a
staff memorandum that the plan was adopted with a racially dis-
criminatory purpose as well.2 6- The number of affirmative Section 2
lawsuits filed by the Voting Section was also unimpressive by compari-
son to the dockets of private voting rights organizations. And when
Thornburg v. Gingles went to the Supreme Court, the Department filed
an amicus curiae brief siding with the state of North Carolina against
the African-American plaintiffs. 0 7 Yet on balance the protections af-
forded minority voters by federal voting rights law in the 1980s effec-
tively constrained Reynolds' conservative instincts.
Rights Act: Hearings on S. 53, S. 1761, S. 1975, S. 1992 and H.R. 3112 Before the Subcommittee on the
Constitution of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., 1655-1850 (1982).
204 Posner, supra note 194, at 88-89.
205 I base this assertion on publicly available documents, especially those contained in the
Nomination of William Bradford Reynolds to be Associate Attorney General of the United States, and on
the work of legal commentators, but not on review of internal documents. See Nomination of
William Bradford Reynolds to be Associate Attorney General of the United States: Hearings Before the Senate
Comm. On the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985) [hereinafter Reynolds Nomination Hearings];
Guinier, supra note 135, at 407. A revised and abridged version of this article is available in
LANI GUINIER, THE TYRANNY OF THE MAJORITY: FUNDAMENTAL FAIRNESS IN A REPRESENTATIVE
DEMOCRACY 21-40 (1994).
206 See Major v. Treen, 574 F. Supp. 325 (E.D. La. 1983); Reynolds Nomination Hearings, supra
note 205, at 410-39 (reporting the memorandum of Robert N. Kwan).
207 Guinier, supra note 135, at 403, 405-06.
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XI. THE ROLE OF THE COURTS IN POLICY IMPLEMENTATION
We have examined the role of the federal courts in the implemen-
tation of two extraordinarily successful public policies, the one per-
son, one vote principle and the prevention of minority vote dilution.
The impact of these two policies on electoral politics in the South has
been profound .2 0  How can we account for this success?
Political scientist Richard Cortner attributes the successful imple-
mentation of the one person, one vote policy to six factors. First, the
Court was clear about what its orders require: compliance entails only
the use of simple arithmetic to design districts of equal population.
Second, the lower courts readily implemented the standard, in con-
trast to their reluctance in the area of school desegregation. A third
factor was the availability of litigants willing and able to serve as plain-
tiffs, since courts themselves cannot file lawsuits. Fourth, the courts
had the means to implement their orders: legislatures and local gov-
erning bodies routinely complied with the equal population re-
quirement. Fifth, implementation of the policy did not, again in con-
trast to school desegregation, require supporting action by the
President or Congress. Finally, those adversely affected by the reap-
portionment decisions, primarily legislators from rural areas, had lit-
tle power to block enforcement of the policy. 209 By the 1980s, the one
person, one vote requirement had become sacrosanct.
The reasons for the success of the Voting Rights Act are similar.21°
First, the statute explicitly gave great authority to the federal courts-
and to the Department of Justice acting as a surrogate for the
courts-to enforce its provisions. Second, these provisions, especially
Sections 2 and 5, were straightforward and rather easily imple-
mented; they required only changes in voter registration procedures,
the conduct of balloting, or the method of election in the affected ju-
risdictions (all already precisely regulated by state law or local ordi-
nance). Third, for the most part the courts enforced the Act vigor-
ously along the lines defined by a supportive Supreme Court, even
208 My use of the terms implementation and impact is consistent with the conventional mean-
ing of these terms. See, e.g., EUGENE BARDACH, THE IMPLEMENTATION GAME: WHAT HAPPENS
AFTER A BILL BECOMES A LAW 36-37 (1977); Paul Sabatier & Daniel Mazmanian, The Implementa-
tion of Public Policy: A Framework of Analysis, 8 POL. STUD. J. 541 (Special Issue No. 2, 1980); Don-
ald S. Van Meter & Carl E. Van Horn, The Policy Implementation Process: A Conceptual Framework, 6
ADMIN. & Soc'Y 447 (1975).
20 CORTNER, supra note 3, at 257-61.
210 The following discussion is taken from Peyton McCrary, Why the Voting Rights Act
Worked: A Judicial Model of Policy Implementation, Paper Presented to the Association for
Public Policy Analysis and Management, Washington, D.C. (Nov. 1997) (on file with author).
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though these complex, fact-intensive lawsuits came to require great
quantities of time and effort. Fourth, the Congress proved consis-
tently supportive of expanding minority voting rights, endorsing the
prohibition on minority vote dilution in 1970, expanding coverage to
language minorities in 1975, and establishing a clear statutory results
test in 1982. Congressional support reflected the general public ac-
ceptance of minority voting rights, where remedies did not require
whites (except perhaps incumbent officeholders) to give up individ-
ual benefits. Fifth, the development of an effective voting rights bar
and continued availability of willing minority plaintiffs kept the issue
of vote dilution before the federal courts. Finally, once remedies
were in place-typically single-member district plans that gave minor-
ity voters a reasonably good chance of electing candidates of their
choice (usually at less than their proportion of the voting-age popula-
tion)-no further monitoring by the court was required.
The impact ofjudicial implementation depends, of course, on the
efficacy of the remedies typically ordered by the courts. In the case of
voting rights, the success of the Act in the South is usually measured
in increased black voter participation and representation. Because
racially polarized voting has consistently been the norm in the South,
black voters were rarely elected at large or in white-majority districts,
but they were typically able to win in black-majority districts drawn to
satisfy the Voting Rights Act.
21'
There is remarkable similarity between the factors leading to suc-
cessful implementation of these two court-directed policies. It seems
plausible that these factors would be applicable to policy implementa-
tion in other areas. If so, then the effectiveness ofjudicial implemen-
tation might be expected to vary with the degree to which the follow-
ing factors are present:
1) general public acceptance of the goals of the policy, and the
absence of potential litigants who can demonstrate that they have
suffered harm from the policy;
21 Once serving on the governing body or in the legislature, however, minority officeholders
were successful only to the degree that they were able to participate in winning coalitions and
reshape the agenda to better meet the needs of their constituents. In my view, these goals are
beyond the scope of the remedies possible under the Act. But see Lani Guinier, No Two Seats:
The Elusive Quest for Political Equality, 77 VA. L. REV. 1413 (1991); Lani Guinier, The 7Humph of
Tokenism: The Voting Rights Act and the Theoy of Black Electoral Success, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1077
(1991). Revised and abridged versions of these two articles are found in GuINIER, supra note
205, at 41-70, 71-118.
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2) relative consensus within the court system concerning the in-
terpretation of the statute, and related case law;
3) the ability of the courts to put easily enforced remedies into ef-
fect; and
4) the durability of court-ordered remedies without routine moni-
toring by the courts.
Ultimately the continued effectiveness of any court-driven policy
depends upon the degree to which the case law supports vigorous en-
forcement. The one person, one vote standard is considered sacro-
sanct; every redistricting plan displays unquestioning obedience to
the principle of population equality. Where there is no consensus in
the courts about the legal standard to be enforced, on the other
hand, the courts will necessarily be less effective as an instrument of
policy implementation. That is what happened in the 1990s, when a
5-4 conservative majority on the Supreme Court reinterpreted the
guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment in a way that made it a
barrier to full equality for minority voters. 1
The enormous increase in minority electoral participation and
representation in the South between 1965 and 1990 is directly attrib-
utable to the effective implementation of the Voting Rights Act and,
between 1965 and 1982, to the Fourteenth Amendment. Its success
stems from the power given to the courts and to the Department of
Justice to conduct searching inquiries into the relationship between
race and voter choice at the local and state level, and to assure
through legally enforceable decisions that minority voters compete
with the majority on a level playing field. Those critics who lament
the Act as an unwarrantable intrusion into the political process are
now beginning to be quoted approvingly in court decisions hostile to
minority voting rights. 13 They are right in saying that the Act is intru-
sive. Alas, in light of the continued level of racially polarized voting
212 See Karlan, supra note 14, at 288; McDonald, supra note 14, at 273-74.
23 Supreme Court decisions in which conservative justices have approvingly cited conserva-
tive legal commentator Abigail Thernstrom include Johnson v. DeGrandy, 512 U.S. 997 (1994);
Holderv. Hall, 512 U.S. 874 (1994); and Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993). For trial court dis-
cussions citing Thernstrom's work, see France v. Pataki, 71 F. Supp. 2d 317 (S.D.N.Y. 1999); Reed
v. Town of Babylon, 914 F. Supp. 843, 885 (E.D.N.Y. 1996);Johnson v. Miller, 864 F. Supp. 1354,
1384 (S.D. Ga. 1994); Shaw v. Hunt, 861 F. Supp. 408 (E.D.N.C. 1994); and Turner v. Arkansas,
784 F. Supp. 553 (E.D. Ark. 1991).
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in most areas of the South, the historical record fails to indicate that
fair elections could have been achieved in the South without it.
